By Elez Biberaj*/

*Presentation at the Conference on “Kosova-U.S. Relations and Public Diplomacy: Looking Into the Future” 

George Washington University 

February 18, 2025

The United States and Kosova have had a unique, multi-faceted, special relationship. As any bilateral, asymmetrical relationship, this one, too, has gone through different phases, experiencing significant transformations – from periods of intensive interactions, convergence of interests, and a high level of cooperation and coordination of policies, to a more complex relationship, which at times has been shaped by discord over fundamental issues.

The United States has been the driving force behind Kosova’s liberation, declaration of independence, and the consolidation of statehood. 

Successive American administrations, Republican and Democratic, have pursued a consistent policy toward Kosova. America’s vision of Kosova has been one of a stable, prosperous and democratic country, with strong independent institutions, good governances, respect for the rule of law and minority rights, and good relations with neighbors. 

For decades, the U.S. has been engaged in a sustained manner in helping Kosova confront its internal and external challenges, promoting its stability and democratization, and providing substantial diplomatic, political, economic, and military support. The U.S. assumed a direct and leading role in securing Kosova’s international standing. American public diplomacy efforts on behalf of Kosova were instrumental in securing recognition from more than 100 countries. The United States also played a critical role in defending Kosova’s case at the International Court of Justice, which ruled that Kosova’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Kosova enjoyed widespread bipartisan support and was the focus of high-level attention. Kosovar leaders and officials enjoyed unusual access to key American policymakers. In the last decades, the U.S. has provided some $2 billion in assistance. A contingent of American troops is part of KFOR, which provides for Kosova’s security.

For its part, Kosova has been a staunch American ally, an important partner in the Balkans, and a supporter of U.S. foreign policy actions. It has shared the U.S. objectives of countering Russian and Chinese influence and destabilizing efforts in the region. At Washington’s request, it has also accepted Afghan refugees. Kosova is no doubt the most pro-American country in Europe. Many Albanians have come to view the relationship as permanent and crucial to Kosova’s wellbeing.

Thanks in great part to America’s support, Kosova is a success story. It has made significant progress in consolidating its statehood, it has a functioning democratic order, a market economy, and constructive relationships with all its neighbors, with the exception of Serbia. Kosova does not differ substantially from its neighbors in terms of governance, rule of law, independent institutions, protection of minorities, respect for human rights, press freedoms and holding orderly elections.

Despite this progress, Kosova is in a transitional phase. Its biggest challenge is the threat from Serbia. Twenty-five years after the end of the 1999 war, Belgrade continues to undermine Kosova’s sovereignty, supporting parallel structures in the north, instigating violent incidents, and working against Kosova’s membership in international institutions.

While the world has moved on, Albanians and Serbs remain hostage of their troubled past. They still view their relationship in terms of a zero-sum game. With competing visions of their relationship, the two parties have failed to take ownership and advance the reconciliation process. While Kosova seeks recognition from Belgrade, Serbia strives for a de facto partition and thus far has rejected any outcome that would strengthen Kosova’s sovereignty.

The U.S. and the EU have worked closely to facilitate a dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, addressing a series of issues with the hope that at the end of the process there would be a reconciliation and Serbia would  recognize Kosova. The EU-facilitated talks resulted in the signing of a series of agreements in 2013 and 2015, providing for the integration of police and judicial authorities in the north into Kosova’s system, reciprocity of license plates, and, most controversial, the establishment of an association of Serbian majority municipalities. 

While some of the accords were implemented, the agreement calling for an association of Serbian majority municipalities became a major point of disagreement. Almost immediately, Belgrade and Prishtina offered different interpretations of the agreement, with Belgrade insisting that the association must have executive powers – a red line for all major political forces in Kosova. Many Albanians came to believe that the agreement was flawed and that the dialogue process was essentially an attempt to re-negotiate independence. In their view, the U.S. and the EU were compelling Prishtina to make concessions, while failing to apply adequate pressure on President Alexandar Vucic to recognize Kosova.

The establishment of the Specialist Chambers at the Hague was also a hugely polarizing issue. Albanians viewed the establishment of the Special Court as an attack on its sovereignty and as an attempt to equate Serbia’s crimes with Albanian crimes. President Hashim Thaci’s indictment in June 2020, while he was on his way to the White House for a meeting with President Trump and President Vucic, was seen by both his supporters and opponents as a hugely humiliating event.

Kosova’s government faced increased challenges in balancing the priority of extending its authority in the north with requests to accommodate Serbian demands, which were clearly aimed at diminishing Kosova’s sovereignty. Prishtina leaders were unable to propose a credible alternate option to the association agreement or develop a coherent policy toward its Serbian minority. Meanwhile, they faced the uncomfortable situation where the U.S., its key ally, was gradually, but unmistakenly, shifting its policies and, in their view, was increasingly siding with Serbia. Many Albanians could not understand Washington’s lack of a display of sympathy for Prishtina’s position and how Western powers, that had launched the military campaign that liberated Kosova, did not view Serbia through their prism. But the U.S. and its European allies had never seen Serbia through the lens of Kosova, and their posture on Kosova was part of a wider, regional context. President Vucic had been rehabilitated – only Albanians remembered his connections with the Milosevic regime – and was now viewed as an important interlocutor on various issues.

Despite emerging disagreements and moments of strain over the stalemate of talks with Serbia, Prishtina worked closely with Washington. Senior leaders, such as presidents Thaci, Fatmir Sejdiu, Atifete Jahjaga, and prime ministers Isa Mustafaj, Ramush Haradinaj, and Avdullah Hoti sustained the image of strong ties, and cooperation continued to expand in all fields.

After his election as president, Hashim Thaci decided that he, rather than the prime minister, as was the practice until then, would lead the talks with Serbia. This became a highly personalized negotiating process, with little input from other local stakeholders. After a series of meetings with Vucic, in summer 2018 Thaci proposed what he termed as a “border correction” with Serbia. His plan fomented internal divisions and serious policy differences emerged between Thaci and Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, who denounced the president as the grave digger of Kosova’s independence. The dialogue came to a halt in December 2018, when Haradinaj imposed 100% tariffs on goods from Serbia.

Kosova’s strong and vibrant relationship with the United States was severely tested with Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s accession to power. Kurti scored an impressive victory in the 2021 elections, securing 58 out of 120 seats in the parliament. He had a stronger mandate than any other leader since independence to make tough decisions in advancing the reconciliation process with Serbia.

From the outset, Kurti made it clear that the dialogue was not at the top of his agenda. He reluctantly participated in talks with Serbia, but not much progress was achieved. In March 2023, Kurti and Vucic accepted a EU-mediated agreement, known as the Ohrid Agreement, aimed at the full normalization of relations. The Ohrid Agreement provides a road map for the implementation of previous agreements, foresees a level of self-management for the Serb minority, and mutual recognition of state symbols. The agreement does not require Belgrade to recognize Kosova, but it prevents Serbia from blocking Kosova’s membership in international organizations. While Vucic orally agreed to accept the agreement, he refused to sign it. Prime Minister Ana Brnabic subsequently sent a letter to Brussels, stating that Serbia could not implement some parts of the agreement that implied Belgrade’s de facto recognition of Kosova.

The EU insisted that the agreement was binding and urged both sides to implement it. Kurti expressed a willingness to sign the agreement, but he insisted that Kosova would not proceed with the implementation unless Vucic also signed the agreement and withdrew Brnabic’s letter. 

Meanwhile, the situation in the north deteriorated, with a series of violent incidents. Serb members of the parliament, mayors, judges, prosecutors, and police officers resigned. Kurti responded by taking actions to integrate the north in the country’s legal and administrative system. He dismantled parallel institutions, closed down Serbian banks, mandated the use of the EURO currency, and increased the presence of special security forces. Kurti used nationalist rhetoric and wielded a narrative that justified his measures as having enhanced Kosova’s sovereignty. His actions were popular with his supporters and welcomed by the population at large, but they dealt a strategic setback to Kosova.

Despite repeated requests from American and EU officials to coordinate such controversial actions in the north, Kurti failed to show deference to the U.S., thus seriously undermining relations with Kosova’s most important strategic ally. Both the U.S. and the EU imposed punitive measures on Kosova.

Ironically, Kurti’s term in office coincided with that of Joe Biden. The President was intimately familiar with Albanian-Serbian issues and, as senator and vice president, was one of Kosova’s strongest supporters. Senior members of his administration had played significant roles during the 1999 war and were considered friends of Kosova. Instead of taking advantage of these personal relationships and access to most senior policy makers, Kurti managed to alienate some of Kosova’s most ardent American supporters.

Kurti did not make serious efforts to sustain Kosova’s most important relationship. He dismissed the punitive measures imposed on his country and maintained the illusion that the relationship with the United States was intact. He also failed to engage in public diplomacy efforts to explain his government’s position or offer a credible alternative option that might have been acceptable to Washington. While public diplomacy efforts by themselves could not have shaped policy outcomes favorable to Prishtina, they could have contributed to relationship building and a better understanding of the factors that underpinned Kosova’s policies. 

This contrasted with the approach pursued in the past by Kosova’s leaders. In the 1990s, Ibrahim Rugova engaged in extensive public outreach, explaining Kosova’s positions, and making efforts to garner support and strengthen ties. He succeeded in building valuable relationships and affinity for Kosova’s position. President Rugova also engaged the small, but influential, Albanian-American community, which played a major role in raising public awareness and enlisting U.S. support. Albanian-Americans used a variety of tactics and media outreach to key policy officials – at the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department. Community activists also secured significant support in the Congress. Powerful legislators, such as Rep. Tom Lantos, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Sen. Bob Dole, Sen. Joe Biden, Rep. Eliott Engel, and others, became strong supporters of Kosova. After liberation, Rugova and other Kosovar leaders continued to make creative use of public outreach in the American policy and media arena. 

Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused a significant realignment of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Balkans. The Biden Administration focused on engaging Serbia in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although Serbia under President Vucic had consistently undermined the negotiation process with Kosova, U.S. attitudes toward Serbia shifted in ways that undermined Kosova’s position. Moderating Serbia’s aggressive stance toward Kosova took second place to efforts to convince Belgrade to change its pro-Russia stance.

 There was a widespread recognition that Kurti had mismanaged relations with the United States and perhaps squandered the best opportunity he had during his stint as prime minister to significantly advance his country’s interests. While his actions damaged Kosova’s special relationship with the United States, they do not appear to have measurably improved Kosova’s position. Prishtina’s authority in the north remains tenuous and the integration of Serbs may have become more difficult.

Today, the U.S.-Kosova relationship is at an inflection point. The new Trump administration and the recent elections in Kosova present both challenges and opportunities to get the U.S.-Kosova relationship back on track.

Kosova faces a new geo-political situation, which is not necessarily in its favor. President Trump’s foreign policy view is transactional and he has ushered in deep policy shifts. The emerging thaw in U.S.-Russia relations, the coercive diplomacy being applied against Ukraine to make concessions to Moscow, and other shifts in U.S. strategy, signal a departure from Washington’s previous agenda of promoting democracy, fighting Russia’s push into the Balkans, and challenging growing authoritarianism in the region.

The Trump administration has yet to formulate a clear strategy toward the Balkans and it remains to be seen if Kosova will be the focus of the administration’s attention. The President’s message to President Vjosa Osmani, delivered on February 11, on the occasion of Kosova’s Independence Day was reassuring. He expressed full support for Kosova and said the United States “is looking forward to building a more productive relationship with the Kosovan government in the coming year.”

But Kosova remains most vulnerable to the shift in U.S. policy and the new geo-political landscape. Serbia already feels embolden by Trump’s return to the White House. In a speech at a rally in Sremska Mitrovica on the occasion of Serbia’s Statehood Day, on February 15, Vucic struck an aggressive tone. He declared that Kosova was “part of our territory,” and claimed that the three-month student protests were instigated by foreigners because he refused to “capitulate” on the Kosova issue. He specifically denounced USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy for allegedly sponsoring a “color revolution” aimed at ousting him from power. Vucic could attempt to use the Kosova issue to deflect attention from growing domestic unrest through provocative incidents in the north and by pressing ahead with his demands for a Dayton-like arrangement. Kosova lacks the capacity to provide for its own security and it can no longer take for granted that KFOR would protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Kosova’s recent elections, however, offer an opportunity. The new situation mandates a mature leadership that is able to take concrete and sustained actions to restore Kosova’s tarnished relations with the United States and seek Washington’s help in reaching an accommodation with Serbia that enhances its sovereignty. This necessitates the quick formation of a new government. Regardless of who forms the next government, Kurti or the opposition forces, Kosova needs a cross-party agreement to develop a coherent policy, and pragmatic, heavy-weight senior officials with the necessary skills to navigate complex situations. In the past, lack of consensus on fundamental issues damaged Kosova’s standing and created ill-will among its strongest foreign supporters. Given the uncertainties associated with the current strategic shifts and the fact that Kosova is operating from a weaker position, the country’s main political forces will need to put aside their narrow political interests, develop a unified position on critical issues, and map out a clear way ahead.

The appointment of EU’s new Special Representative for Kosova-Serbia dialogue offers the prospect for a fresh start. But a deal between Kosova and Serbia that would lead to mutual recognition is unlikely in the absence of an intensive American diplomatic engagement. Having made such huge investments in Kosova, the U.S. should now help Kosova get to the finishing line in its efforts to cement its sovereignty and achieve lasting peace with Serbia. 

Washington has the leverage, credibility and ability to help Kosova shape its future. A sovereign, stable, prosperous, and democratic Kosova is in the U.S. national interest.