‘Spirit’ Of The Iran Nuclear Deal Is A Two-Way Street

October 10, 2017 by dgreca

President Trump has given Iranian hardliners incentive to restart and weaponize their nuclear program.

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump waves to the crowd after speaking during a rally opposing the Iran nuclear deal outside the Capitol in Washington, Wednesday, Sept. 9, 2015. (AP Photo/Susan Walsh)

NGA DAVID PHILLIPS/

The Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a bet. Strict verification would ensure Iran’s technical compliance in the short term. Iran, having benefited politically and economically from integration into the international system, would choose not to resume enrichment activities when the deal expires in 10-15 years. President Donald J. Trump’s bellicose rhetoric has undermined the “spirit” of the agreement, giving hard-liners in Tehran incentive to restart and weaponize Iran’s nuclear program.So far, however, the deal is working. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran stopped producing fissile material at its declared facilities. It also found that Iran dismantled two-thirds of its active centrifuges and eliminated 98 percent of its enriched uranium stock.

Trump calls the JCPOA the “worst deal ever.” He objects to unfreezing Iranian assets. He asserts that the JCPOA gives Iran a legal path to developing nuclear weapons.

The deal does not require Iran to dismantle the Arak heavy water processing facility, which can be restarted in 1-2 years. Moreover, the ban on building new heavy water reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants becomes voluntary after 15 years.

Iran is allowed to retain its infrastructure for enriching uranium, which can be expanded in 10 years for research and development. Between years 2025 and 2030, centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility can start spinning highly enriched uranium. All constraints on enrichment will be lifted by 2030.

To justify decertifying Iran, Trump condemns Iran for betraying the “spirit” of the deal. He cites Iran’s threats against Israel; assistance to terror groups like Hezbollah; and testing of the Khorramshahr missile in violation of the UN Security Council resolution.

However objectionable, Iran’s actions are not prohibited under the JCPOA, which focuses exclusively on nuclear issues. The JCPOA is not a grand bargain. It was, however, the best deal possible negotiating with Iran’s wily Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.

Zarif has often spoken to me about “Persian pride.” He suggested that pride was one of Iran’s major motivations for developing its nuclear capacity. If the U.S. had not demonized Iran for its nuclear activities, Iran might not have been enriching uranium or producing plutonium in the first place.

We will never know if this hypothetical is true. However, we do know that Iran’s current actions undermine confidence.

The JCPOA is a long game, establishing a process for confidence building between Iran and the international community. Iran may be in full compliance with the JCPOA’s technical requirements. But by castigating Iran for actions outside the scope of the JCPOA, Trump himself is betraying the spirit of the accord and pushing Iran towards resuming its nuclear program. The international community increasingly doubts whether Trump is a rational actor.

To Iranian hard-liners, Trump proves that America is the “Great Satan”. By decertifying Iran, Trump is pushing Iran to withdraw from the JCPOA. By undermining trust, Trump makes it less likely that Iran would voluntarily abandon its nuclear program.

Trump will not be President when provisions of the JCPOA sunset. A more balanced successor will face the challenge of dissuading Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.

David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert to the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau of the State Department during the administration of George W. Bush.

Why Serbia must recognize Kosovo’s independence

September 7, 2017 by dgreca

Lack of progress has a negative impact in both states/

1 David L. Phillips

By David L. Phillips/

Brussels insists Serbia normalize relations with Kosovo before it can join the European Union (EU). So far 114 countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence. However, Serbia campaigns against Kosovo’s efforts to gain greater global recognition. It also supports parallel private structures in North Kosovo, which undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty and foment unrest among Kosovo Serbs. The Kosovo-Serbia conundrum can be solved with more effective international mediation. Diplomacy works best when Europe and the United States work together.

Recent statements by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic give rise to optimism. He called on the Serbian nation to “stop burying its head in sand” on the issue of Kosovo, and start “an internal dialogue.” He told Serbs “to be realistic.”

A grand bargain may be in the works. While normalization starts by addressing many bilateral issues, it all comes down to Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Recognition would lead to Kosovo’s membership in the United Nations. Kosovo and Serbia would negotiate the EU’s membership criteria, ultimately entering the EU at the same time.

A framework for negotiations already exits. The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was launched by the EU in 2011. Kosovo and Serbia finalized agreements on technical issues such as freedom of movement, integrated border management, and license plates. However, implementation has been uneven. The 2013 Brussels Agreement affirmed a “European future” for Kosovo and Serbia. At best, there is patchy progress on the political track.

Existing agreements must be enforced. The EU should suspend its mediation if either side stonewalls its commitments. An official EU Monitoring Mechanism would report to member states via the Political Security Committee of the EU Council.

The EU should condition funds provided to Kosovo and Serbia through its Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Program. “No progress, no chapters” would be the guiding principle, linking progress in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to Serbia’s EU aspirations.

Mediators need an end game to their diplomacy. The Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Martti Ahtisaari, who served as U.N.special envoy from 2005 to 2008, knew the outcome of his efforts before taking the job. Today’s mediators need strategic and moral clarity.

A new format could galvanize negotiations. The EU should appoint an international heavyweight as special envoy. Wolfgang Schauble, Germany’s finance minister, has clout and negotiating experience. He would be formidable in this role. Given her overall experience and work in the Balkans as U.S. secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice would be ideal as the U.S. special representative.

Dialogue cannot be open-ended. Mediators should set a deadline of 18 months. The clock would start ticking when the dialogue is upgraded and relaunched.

The people of Kosovo and Serbia must be kept informed. The Kosovo and Serbia delegations could include a “unity team,” comprised of major political parties and civil society representatives.

A deal won’t be easy. There is a plethora of bilateral issues to be addressed. There are up 1,500 missing persons from the war. A Regional Commission for Facts about War Crimes could help assuage the families of victims. An estimated $1.5 billion in Kosovo pension funds and a $600,000 privatization fund were seized by Serbia. In turn, Serbia wants to recover the value of its investments in Kosovo. A compensation plan is needed. Kosovo needs a comprehensive plan to integrate Kosovo Serbs, while providing local autonomy to enhance minority rights.

The United States has an interest in brokering a deal between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo is on the front line of Russia’s new cold war with the West. Moscow has been transferring sophisticated weapons to Serbia, including MIG-29 fighter aircraft, T-72 battle tanks, and BUK surface-to-air missiles. In December, a Russian-made train emblazoned with the message “Kosovo is Serbian” in 20 languages was stopped by Kosovo authorities at the border. The ensuing war of words almost spiraled into a violent confrontation.

Lack of progress has a negative impact in both Kosovo and Serbia. Failure to fully integrate into the international system undermines Kosovo’s economy, which suffers from 30 percent unemployment and even higher youth unemployment. Lack of economic development has fueled an underground economy. Criminality, corruption and cronyism are widespread in the region.

Denial of visa liberalization for Kosovo citizens has made them disillusioned with the West. Islamism is on the rise. Scores of Kosovo Albanians joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. With financing from Turkey, the biggest mosque in the Balkans is planned for Pristina, Kosovo’s capital.

Serbia is stigmatized by its genocidal practices during the 1990s. It remains a borderline failed state, caught between its dark history, European aspirations and Russia’s nefarious influence. Absent economic reforms, Serbia has become a hub for organized crime and all sorts of trafficking. North Kosovo is run by a criminal gang under Belgrade’s control. A mutually symbiotic relationship exists between gangs in North Kosovo and their mafia counterparts in Serbia and the region.

Serbia wants to gain EU membership as soon as it normalizes relations with Kosovo. Would Euro-Atlantic integration solve Serbia’s problems with Kosovo? Can Serbia deliver Russia’s agreement for Kosovo to join the U.N.? Would Serbiablock Kosovo’s EU membership once it becomes an EU member? Globalists in the Trump administration can achieve a foreign policy success by engaging in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. An agreement between Kosovo and Serbia would stabilize a strategically important region in Europe, reaffirm the importance of trans-Atlantic cooperation, and underline Washington’s indispensable diplomatic role.

• David L. Phillips is director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He is the author of “Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention” (MIT Press, 2012).

Milosevic Lost Kosovo: Can Serbia Let Go?

August 10, 2017 by dgreca

1 David L. Phillips

By David L. Phillips/

Serbia wants to join the European Union (EU). Brussels is clear: no EU membership for Serbia until it normalizes relations with Kosovo. Normalization means recognizing Kosovo’s independence.Kosovo rejected ties to Serbia in 1991, in response to Slobodan Milosevic’s draconian repression. More than 10,000 Kosovo Albanians died and up to one million were displaced during Serbia’s crackdown.

NATO launched air strikes on 24 March 1999, aimed at preventing ethnic cleansing. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 ended the war and established the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK provided provisional systems for self-government and facilitated a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status, putting Kosovo on the path to statehood.

When Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, Serbia challenged Kosovo’s declaration at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the ICJ found that the declaration conformed to international law. According to then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice: “The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation – including Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration – are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case.”

Kosovo’s independence caused despair, disbelief and anger across Serbia and in Kosovo’s Serbian enclaves. To many Serbs, Kosovo is the holiest and most important part of Serbia, the cradle of Serbian spirituality, culture and statehood. Serbs believe in the divine origin of Serbian rule. The organ pipes of the fourteenth century Decani Orthodox Monastery in Kosovo were reputedly forged from the swords of Serbian nobility slain fighting the Ottoman Turks. Serbs view the 1389 Battle of Kosovo as part of an ongoing struggle between two civilizations – one Christian and European and the other Islamic and Asiatic.

To this day, Serbia refuses to admit that Kosovo is lost; Kosovo will never again be under Serbia’s control. So far, 114 countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence.

Serbia systematically tries to impede Kosovo’s efforts to gain greater global recognition. It undermines Kosovo’s state-building, setting up parallel structures in North Kosovo where Kosovo Serbs reside. With Russia’s backing, it backs campaigns against Kosovo’s membership in international organizations such as INTERPOL and UNESCO.

Serbia’s approach may be evolving. On 24 July 2017, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic published an article calling on the Serbian nation to “stop burying its head in sand” on the issue of Kosovo, and to start “an internal dialogue.” According to Vucic, “We must try to be realistic, not lose or give away what we have, but not expect to receive what we have lost long ago.”

Vucic can deliver a deal on Kosovo. He has a strong mandate based on his nationalist monopoly, and was recently elected to a 5-year term.

His position has support. According to Serbia’s Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic, “Times and international relations have changed.” Vuk Draskovic, head of the Serbian Renewal Movement, concurs: Serbia should “accept and recognize the Kosovo reality,” as the basis of “a sustainable solution.” The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, traditionally hardline, has no objection.

What motivated Vucic to write about Kosovo and propose an internal dialogue among Serbs in the middle of the summer? Is he really sincere about solving the Kosovo-Serbia problem, or is he simply appearing reasonable to gain favor in Brussels.

Vucic is a both a pragmatist and a canny politician. Serbia is required to make constitutional reforms to meet standards in the EU “acquis communautaires.” Negotiations over EU membership will require Serbia to conduct fundamental changes to its legal, economic and political system, resulting in the Europeanization of Serbian constitutional law.

The Serbian Radical Party, the largest party in opposition to the Vucic government, strongly opposes constitutional reforms. Vucic may be trying to highlight a stark choice: either support recognition of Kosovo on the one hand or reforms on the other. The latter is far more acceptable to most Serbs.

Vucic may be trying to distract Serbs from the country’s economic problems. In a big blow to Serbia’s economy, FIAT, the largest foreign investor in Serbia, could close its factory in Kragujevac. Vucic needs popular support for economic reforms encompassing the state administration, public finances, and the economy in order to advance EU accession.

Or Vucic could be trying to cause a nationalist backlash, resulting in a crisis. Serbia would respond by annexing North Kosovo, realizing Milosevic’s partition plan. This scenario is unlikely. Creating a crisis in Kosovo is risky brinksmanship. Vucic knows there is no military solution, and that military action in North Kosovo would destroy Serbia’s prospects for EU membership.

Is Vucic laying the ground for a grand bargain?

A grand bargain would entail recognition of Kosovo by Serbia. Kosovo would join the UN, while both Kosovo and Serbia continue work on meeting EU membership criteria, entering the EU at the same time.

The Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, mediated by the EU with a new approach and under a different format, could lead to a breakthrough, resolving one of Europe’s most intractable conflicts.

David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert at the U.S. State Department during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Phillips is author of Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and US Intervention.

Author’s Note: The Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights will publish an “Implementation Review of the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.” Scheduled for release on 5 September 2017, the report proposes an enhanced mediation format for more effective engagement by the international community. It offers a “win-win”, based on recognition of Kosovo by Serbia and normalization of all bilateral issues, leading to integration of Kosovo and Serbia into multilateral and Euro-Atlantic institutions.(Kortezi: The Huffington Post)

Don’t blame the Kurds for Iraq’s unraveling

July 28, 2017 by dgreca

By David L. Phillips* /

1 David L. Phillips

Fighting ISIS created a false sense of national unity among Iraqis. Now that Mosul is liberated, Iraqis must confront their rivalries and decide the country’s future. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has called for national unity, but Iraqremains deeply divided.The Government of Iraq (GOI) has no apparent plan for resettlement, reconstruction or reconciliation.

Mosul is a wasteland of rubble and ruin. Without stability and security, displaced people cannot return to their homes. They also need shelter and services, such as water and electricity. Reconstruction will cost at least $1 billion.

The GOI needs to address the root causes of conflict, engaging Sunnis in the political process. However, it seems unwilling or unable to address the political and economic conditions that radicalized Sunnis and gave rise to the Islamic State in the first place.

Iraq is a graveyard of betrayal and false promises.

The November 2010 Erbil Agreement established 19 power-sharing principles. It resolved a political crisis between Shiites and Sunnis, dividing leadership positions across a multiparty and multisectarian coalition. However, the agreement was never implemented. Instead of power-sharing, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki harassed and arrested prominent Sunni politicians. He purged Iraq’s professional armed forces of Sunni officers and brought security forces and militias under his direct control. Mr. Maliki cut the budget of the Sunni Awakening, which fought al Qaeda, leaving thousands unemployed.

Iranian-backed Shiite militias — Popular Mobilization Forces — continue to operate independently with government sanction. Their activities create insecurity in provinces with a mix of Sunnis and Shiites.

Mr. Maliki was replaced by Mr. Abadi as prime minister in 2014. Iraqis view him as weak and ineffective. Sunnis have little confidence, despite Mr. Abadi’s efforts at reform.

Iraqi Kurds have likewise lost faith in Baghdad’s ability to protect their interests.

After the toppling of Saddam Hussein, Kurds bent over backwards to avoid breaking up Iraq. Kurds deferred their demand for independence, opting for a federal, democratic Iraq, with decentralized governance.

Article 140 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution promised a referendum on the status of Kirkuk. But the referendum never happened.

Failure to address Kirkuk’s status exacerbated other core Kurdish concerns, such as Kurdish ownership of natural resources and the sharing of oil revenues. In 2013, Baghdad suspended payments to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of oil sales from Kirkuk, pocketing the revenue for itself. The U.S. generously supported the Iraqi armed forces, but Baghdad refused to share resources or equipment with Kurdish “Peshmerga.”

The KRG plans a referendum on independence for Sept. 25, 2017. The KRG insists it will not move precipitously, preferring a friendly divorce from Iraq.

Where does the U.S. stand on Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence?

Though the Trump administration is nominally opposed, it is agnostic about assisting Iraq’s long-term recovery. Washington increasingly recognizes that Iraqi Kurds are America’s best partners in the region. They are a bulwark against extremism. The U.S. and Iraqi Kurds share values. Both believe in human rights and democracy. Both adamantly oppose radical Islamism.

In the Middle East, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The KRG does not speak loudly about its cooperation with Israel, including oil shipments to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Kurds and Israelis have a lot in common. Both are small states surrounded by hostile neighbors.

In 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu endorsed the “Kurdish aspiration for independence,” citing “the collapse” of Iraq. According to Mr. Netanyahu, Kurds are a “fighting people that has proved its political commitment, political moderation, and deserves political independence.”

The map of the Middle East is changing. States created by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, such as Iraq and Syria, are inherently unstable.

The U.S. needs a reality-based approach to the Middle East. Iraq is not viable; Arabs in Iraq do not get along. Fighting ISIS may have temporarily masked their differences. But after Mosul, Iraq is still beset by dysfunctional politics.

When Iraq unravels, don’t blame the Kurds. The responsibility for Iraq’s demise rests with Iraqis who pursue sectarian agendas, undermining pluralism and inviting meddlesome nefarious neighbors.

The U.S. should work with its friends, rather than try to placate its adversaries. Iraqi Kurdistan, as a sovereign and independent state, will be a driver of democratization in the region and a reliable ally of the United States.

The Washington Post- Wednesday, July 26, 2017. David L. Phillips is director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a senior adviser and foreign affairs expert to the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau of the U.S. Department of State during the George W. Bush administration. He is author of “Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco” and “The Kurdish Spring: A New Map for the Middle East.” His most recent book is “An Uncertain Ally: Turkey Under Erdogan’s Dictatorship.”

Was Turkey’s Coup For Real?

July 17, 2017 by dgreca

1 david

By David L. Phillips/*

Much speculation exists about the coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Some even call it a “false-coup,” which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan organized in order to justify a crackdown against oppositionists. There are many other instances when a military tried to remove the civilian head of government. Case studies suggest a pattern, which can be used to evaluate the events in Turkey one year ago.

When conducting a coup, the first action involves capturing or killing the head of government, in this instance Erdogan.

In parallel to killing or capturing the head of government, loyal military and security units must be immobilized to prevent them from obstructing the coup.

Public information is critical. The putschists typically seize control of media so they can manage the flow of information to the public. Traditional media outlets involve radio and television, both public and private. New media include social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.

A head of the putsch presents himself so the public can attach a face to the events and find reassurance. If the public protests the coup, mutinous soldiers use all necessary measures to preserve order.

The following occurred in Turkey.

Erdogan was vacationing in Marmaris on July 15. When mutinous soldiers arrived at his hotel to arrest him, Erdogan had checked out and was on his way to Dalaman aiport.

The first inkling of the coup occurred in the early evening when mechanized units used tanks to block the Bosphorus Bridge and the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, crossing from the Asian side to the European side of Istanbul. Land forces on the bridge were joined by the gendarmerie.

Prominent members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) were arrested. Chairman of the General Staff General Hulusi Akar, and Deputy Chief of Staff Yasar Guler were imprisoned at the Akincilar air base on the outskirts of Ankara. Commander of the Land Forces General Salih Zeki Colak, Gendarmerie Commander Galip Mendi, Commander of the Air Force General Abidin Unal, and Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Bulent Bostanoglu were also taken into custody. Hakan Fidan, head of the National Intelligence Agency, was rushed to a secure location.

TRT, Turkey’s public television, was taken off the air. Soldiers also seized control ofCNN Turk, interrupting a live broadcast. No private television channels were affected.

Erdogan disappeared during the coup. In the early hours of the morning, he surfaced to address the nation using FaceTime. He called on followers to take to the streets in defense of Turkey’s democracy.

Imams echoed Erdogan’s appeal. The chant “Allahu akbar” – God is great – reverberated from the muezzins of mosques. Many thousands of supporters went to Ataturk Airport and Taksim Square in Istanbul. They also gathered outside the presidential palace in Ankara.

F-16s controlled by the putschists allegedly bombed the army headquarters and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA).

Though Turkey’s military has a reputation for efficiency, its actions were poorly considered and badly executed. The coup fell far short of best practices for military takeovers.

How could mutinous soldiers have been unaware of Erdogan’s plans to leave the hotel? Failing to find him was a major gaff that undermined the coup from the outset.

Why wasn’t Erdogan apprehended on his way to the airport before his presidential plane took off? The coup plotters possessed F-16 fighter jets. Why didn’t they intercept or shoot down Erdogan’s plane?

Members of the Turkish General Staff representing major branches of the Turkish armed forces were detained. Was their arrest part of the coup design or was it intended to prevent them from joining the ranks of mutineers?

MIT’s Hakan Fidan, was not apprehended. Of all the members of Turkey’s national security establishment, Fidan is closest to Erdogan and best positioned to protect the president. Erdogan once called him his “sır küpü,” which means ‘jar of secrets’.

The putschists never presented themselves to the public, explaining events and offering reassurance.

Why did the coup plotters fail to take over major private networks that most Turks actually watch? Both TRT and CNN Turk have relatively small viewing audiences.

And why did the coup plotters allow social media to function? They could have jammed coverage, but didn’t. It is ironic that Erdogan addressed the nation using FaceTime, a form of social media he vowed to eliminate.

While imams called Erdogan’s supporters to the streets, the putschists issued instructions for people to stay indoors. Allowing Erdogan supporters free reign allowed a groundswell of popular support for the president.

Damage to the TGNA was minimal. Crater analysis suggested that explosives inside the building were used, rather than high impact ordinance of fighter jets.

According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, “It does not appear to be a very brilliantly planned or executed event.” Kerry has a knack for understatement. It was a botched coup that showed all the hallmarks of incompetence.

Would Erdogan be so reckless to stage an event that endangered Turkish citizens, killing 265 people? Another theory exists about Erdogan’s complicity.

Rather than organize the coup, Erdogan was either tipped off by members of the putsch or by the intelligence agency of a foreign government. Instead of preventing the coup, Erdogan allowed events to progress just far enough so claims of a coup were credible but not so far as to present any real risk.

In his first public remarks during the early morning of July 16, Erdogan issued a chilling threat: “This latest action is an act of treason. This attempt, this move, is a great gift from God for us. Why? Because the move will allow us to clean up the armed forces, which needs to be completely cleaned.” In a rush to judgement, he vowed to purge all state institutions of “the virus” spread by supporters of Fethullah Gulen.

The Turkish government had already prepared lists of oppositionists. The authorities moved immediately to arrest them. To date, about 50,000 security officers and civil servants have been arrested and another 150,000 dismissed from their jobs. Approximately 150 journalists are in jail. Members of parliament, judges, and educators have also been dismissed or arrested. Instead of reconciliation, Erdogan arrested another 7,000 people on the one-year anniversary. Erdogan vows to approve a bill reinstating the death penalty if parliament proposed it.

Some say Erdogan is paranoid. But even paranoid people have enemies.

Erdogan was profoundly aware of potential challenges from the TSK. Turkey has a history of military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. Erdogan was directly affected by the coup of 1997, which outlawed the Refah Party to which he belonged.

To pre-empt challenges, Erdogan pushed through constitutional reforms affecting the Kemalist judiciary. Pro-government prosecutors conjured fantastical plots, Ergenekon and Operation Sledgehammer, which were used to crack-down on retired and current military officers. Arrests sent shock waves through Turkey’s security establishment.

Events in Egypt further exacerbated Erdogan’s concerns. Erdogan identified closely with Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi as a kindred spirit and fraternal political ally. Morsi was a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a known Islamist. When Morsi was overthrown by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2013, Erdogan feared something similar. He accused the West of masterminding Morsi’s removal.

Erdogan was pro-active to prevent a similar fate. Erdogan’s purge is called a “civilian coup” or a “controlled coup,” because it pervasively eliminated opposition and generated widespread fear in society and professional ranks. An open-ended state of emergency has been used by Erdogan to eliminate the rule of law and systematize repression.

Secrets are hard to keep. Repression is difficult to maintain. Close to two million people rallied in the Maltepe district of Istanbul on July 8. They demand “adalet” — justice and the rule of law. They want answers.

When Erdogan eventually leaves power, Turks and the world will learn what really happened. The truth will come out.

*Mr. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He worked on Turkish issues as a senior adviser and foreign affairs expert to the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs under President Clinton and Bush. His recent book is titled An Uncertain Ally: Turkey Under Erdogan’s Dictatorship.

« Previous Page
1
…
4
5
6
7
8
…
10
Next Page »