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Why Macedonians and Greeks Should Work Together

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Confidence-building initiatives that bring civil society activists in Greece and Macedonia together in practical ways have helped lay some of the groundwork for a potential rapprochement between Skopje and Athens.

By David L. PHILLIPS/

Relations between Greece and Macedonia are at a pivotal point.One hundred and thirty-seven states recognise Macedonia under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia. However, some Greek politicians reject the name.They believe the name hijacks Greek history and culture. They also fear that Macedonia has territorial ambitions over the Greek province of the same name. Citing the ‘name issue’, Greece is blocking Macedonia’s membership in NATO and the European Union.Macedonia’s previous government used Greek obstructionism to bolster its nationalist base.

The atmosphere improved dramatically when Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, SDSM came to power in June 2017.

Zaev has proactively taken steps to assuage Greek concerns. Representatives of Greece and Macedonia who are meeting this week in Brussels will have an opportunity to make progress on one of Europe’s last intractable conflicts.

Civil society in both countries is clamouring for change. Columbia University has been facilitating contact and cooperation between Greeks and Macedonians since 2015. Our partners are promoting positive measures, with tangible benefits to people from both countries.

In March 2015, Columbia University launched the Southeast Europe Dialogue Project. Columbia created a web of contacts and cooperation between civil society in Greece and Macedonia, bringing partners together, helping them think strategically about joint activities, and providing financial assistance.

For example, Columbia facilitated contact between the Chambers of Commerce of Northern Greece, SEVE, and the Macedonian Chambers of Commerce, MCC, who signed a memorandum of understanding committing to work together.

SEVE and MCC now meet regularly and exchange trade delegations; Greek business leaders visited Skopje in September 2017 to discuss agro-industries, viticulture, and construction projects. SEVE published a roadmap – ‘Trade and Investment Opportunities between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.

Journalists from Greece and Macedonia conducted joint interviews with Prime Minister Zaev, President Gjorge Ivanov, and Thessaloniki’s Mayor Ioannis Boutaris. Former Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki published an op-ed in Kathimerini, one of Greece’s leading newspapers.

Greece’s Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias was interviewed by Macedonia’s Telma TV. Macedonian journalists met Greek officials from the Interior Ministry, National Police, and humanitarian activists at the Diavata Refugee Camp outside Thessaloniki. Greek and Macedonian journalists reported extensively on conditions at Diavata.

At a roundtable in Athens hosted by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), journalists explored a mechanism for regular exchange of information enhancing reporting of ‘the other’.

A joint publication – ‘The Balkan Human Corridor’ – included contributions from scholars at Pantheion University in Athens and Saints Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, as well other universities in south-east Europe.

Senior faculty at Pantheion and Saints Cyril and Methodius University brought post-doctoral students together for a shared history project. They published a collection of essays called ‘Balkan Crossroads’. Faculty and students now interact regularly, attend conferences together, and have developed close scholarly and personal relationships.

ELIAMEP and the Skopje Institute for Political Research conducted a series of public opinion surveys on mutual perceptions, including the name issue. They developed parallel questionnaires, survey methodology, and dissemination strategies including events in Athens and Skopje. Updated public opinion surveys will be released early next year.

Hydrologists and water officials held a series of meetings on resource monitoring, information sharing, and flood control. They are working towards the establishment of a Vardar/Axios River Commission.

To this end, they collaborated on a preliminary assessment of sustainable water and river basin resources. Officials from Greece and Macedonia exchanged hydrological data and discussed watershed resource requirements for different sectors, including farming.

Many local partners stand out. None has been more dynamic than Ioannis Boutaris, a principled maverick who relentlessly pursues cooperation. Columbia played a catalytic role, initially arranging meetings for Boutaris with Zaev and Ivanov.

Boutaris and Ivanov are discussing a canal connecting the Danube and Sava rivers. A regatta from Veles to Thessaloniki is planned for the spring. He and his team have been valuable partners, encouraging municipalities on both sides of the border.

Columbia’s project does not directly address the name issue. We focused on confidence-building measures, preparing the ground for constructive bilateral negotiations. Columbia was transparent and independent, informing senior foreign ministry officials from both countries of our activities.

For sure, confidence building is hard work. Our efforts were beset by obstacles: an economic crisis in Greece; a domestic political crisis in Macedonia; and the refugee and migrant crisis that effected both countries. Nonetheless, the participants persevered, forging meaningful professional and personal ties.

How will governments build on the efforts of their civil society?

The 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest affirmed the need to resolve the name issue before Macedonia could integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as NATO and the EU. Relations have been stuck for almost a decade.

To break the logjam, Macedonia is proposing NATO membership under the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.

Article 11 of the 1993 Interim Accord allows Macedonia to apply for membership in international organisations using its recognised name. NATO membership would build momentum towards a full and final settlement of the name issue.

However, Greece insists on resolving the name issue first. It is also concerned about use of the term ‘Macedonian’ to characterise the identity of Macedonians. Greece refuses to acknowledge the Macedonian language, saying that it is actually a dialect of Bulgarian.

Macedonia has floated alternative names such as the ‘Republic of Northern Macedonia’ and the ‘Republic of Upper Macedonia’.” The ‘Republic of Vardar Macedonia’ and ‘New Macedonia’ are other options. Macedonia could apply for NATO membership using one of these alternatives.

Macedonia is trying to create a climate conducive to the talks. It may rename Alexander the Great Airport as part of a deal to resume direct flights between Skopje and Athens. Macedonia may also rename Alexander the Great Highway, the E-75 motorway that connects Skopje to Greece.

Removing references to ‘Alexander the Great’ would mollify Greek nationalists who feel Macedonia is absconding with their cultural heritage. Macedonia has also proposed to review textbooks and remove irredentist messages.

It will be difficult for Greece to compromise. The Greek government includes Defence Minister Pannos Kemmenos, who believes that Macedonia represents a security threat.

Nationalist Greeks are insecure about Greece’s northern border, which was only established in 1913 after the Balkan War. Kemmenos adamantly opposes compromise.

Now is the time to act. Kotzias has called 2018 a “watershed” year. Both countries have elections in 2019.

Greek-Macedonian reconciliation is a win-win. Greece will benefit financially from good neighbourly relations. Last year, two million Macedonians visited Greece for shopping and tourism. More will come.

Prime Minister Alexis Tzipras would garner prestige and respect as a strong leader. Resolving issues with Macedonia would strengthen Greece’s sovereignty at a time when Turkey is demanding to upgrade the Lausanne Treaty, which created the boundaries of modern Greece and making designs on Greek territory in Western Thrace.

Resolving issues with Macedonia would also build on improved relations between Greece and other neighbours, Albania and Bulgaria.

Macedonia will benefit through integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, which will consolidate its democracy, free market reforms, and fight against corruption. The rising tide will contribute to social harmony, promoting the minority rights of ethnic Albanians as enshrined in the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended Macedonia’s internal conflict in 2003.

The United States is an ally of both Greece and Macedonia. It wants to deepen cooperation with both countries to stem the tide of radicalisation and extremism in the Western Balkans.

Washington wants to expand its military presence in Greece and set up new bases in the country. Improved cooperation can also help manage the possibility of another refugee and migrant crisis.

The EU, beset by Brexit, needs to show it is still viable as a proponent of peace in south-east Europe and beyond.

Progress requires vision and courage from statesmen in Greece and Macedonia. By intensifying mediation efforts, the UN, US and EU can help the parties reach agreement.

Civil society interests can be a can be a springboard propelling an agreement, or a safety net when talks are at an impasse.

David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He directs Columbia’s ‘Dialogue Project in Southeast Europe’. Phillips worked on the Balkans as a senior adviser to the State Department during the Clinton Administration. He also served as a senior adviser and foreign affairs expert to the State Department under Presidents Bush and Obama.

 

Turkey’s Trust Deficit

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BY DAVID L.PHILLIPS/*

1 David Filips

Tukey was heralded as an invaluable NATO ally and partner countering violent extremism. My presentation evaluates these assertions and assesses US-Turkey relations under the Trump administration.
NATO Ally

Turkey played an important role as a NATO member, joining the Alliance in 1952. However, NATO is more than a security alliance. It is a coalition of countries with shared values, governed democratically, which uphold human rights. Turkey would not qualify as a NATO member if it applied to join the Alliance today. Under President Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has become anti-democratic, anti-western, and Islamist. In response to the post-coup crackdown, US Secretary of State John Kerry suggested that NATO “measure” Turkey’s actions and suggested reviewing Turkey’s membership. According to Kerry, “NATO has a requirement with respect to democracy”.

Terror Ties

After the US failed to intervene when Syria used chemical weapons against insurgents in Ghouta (21 August 2013), The Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) established an infrastructure for supporting al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and other jihadists who joined the Islamic State. Assistance ranged from military cooperation and weapons transfers to logistical support, financial assistance, and the provision of medical services.

US officials knew about MIT’s role. During remarks at Harvard University (5 October 2014), Vice President Joe Biden indicated: “Our allies in the region were our largest problem in Syria. The Turks, the Saudis, the Emiratis…were so determined to take down Assad and essentially have a proxy Sunni-Shia war…they poured hundreds of millions of dollars, and thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad. The people that were being supplied were al-Nusra and al-Qaeda and extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world.” Biden elaborated, “President Erdogan told me, he’s an old friend, ‘You were right. We let too many people through.” Erdogan denied admitting that Turkey supported Islamist militants. He demanded that Biden apologize for his statement or Biden will become “history to me.” Biden apologized for offending Biden, but did not retract the substance of his remarks.

At a meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (22 September 2014), Erdogan criticized “smear campaigns [and] attempts to distort perceptions about us.” He decried “a systematic attack on Turkey’s international reputation” saying “Turkey has been subject to a very unjust and ill-intentioned news items from media organizations. My request from our friends in the United States is to make your assessment about Turkey by basing your information on objective news sources.”
Columbia University did just that. We established an investigative team in the United States, Europe, and Turkey. We identified scores of credible sources documenting Turkey’s collaboration with jihadi groups. Columbia’s study concluded:

MIT helped “midwife” the Islamic State, according to Cengiz Candar, a well-respected Turkish journalist. Almost all the passports of deceased jihadis in collected in Syria had been stamped in Turkey.

MIT sanctioned and supported the jihadi highway from Sanliurfa to Raqqa. The border was called, “The Gateway to jihad.” According to an ISIS commander, “Most of the fighters who joined us in the beginning came from Turkey and so did our equipment and supplies.”

Many cell phones of jihadis collected in Syria had SIM cards that come from Turkey. There is an extensive record of financial transactions involving hawala systems in Gaziantep and the Istanbul Grand Bazaar.

The Turkish government facilitated weapons supplies, as evidenced by an official directive signed by the Interior Minister sanctioning support to al-Nusra (13 June 2014).

Turkish truck drivers documented their delivery of weapons to combatants in Syria. MIT agents on the border tried to prevent customs agents from inspecting the vehicles. Can Dundar, Cumhurriyet editor in chief, and Erdem Gul, the Ankara Bureau Chief, received sentences of 5 years and ten months and 5 years respectively for reporting MIT’s involvement. The Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a law prohibiting the media to report on MIT’s activities.

Turkey colluded with ISIS during the battle for Kobani. According to Anwar Moslem, Mayor of Kobani, “There is evidence, witnesses, and videos of trains from Turkey full of ammunition…”

Ex-Turkish Special Forces provided training to jihadis. ISIS posted training videos in Turkish. Fighters were recruited in Turkish towns like Konya, as well as in Germany.

Especially in Gaziantep and Sanliurfa, Turkey provided and paid for the medical care of jihadis wounded in Syria, including members of Abu Bakr Baghdadi’s inner circle. Taraf quotes the Minister of Health: “It is a human obligation to care for ISIS wounded.”

Turkey was the chief beneficiary of ISIS oil trade. Oil was transported by convoys of trucks across the border arranged the Powertrans, an oil trading company controlled by Berat Albayrak, Erdogan’s son-in-law. According to the ISIS Finance Ministry, $3.5 million was generated daily through trade with Powertrans. The supply chain of oil and refined oil products ended up in Adana. The BMZ Group, owned by Bilal Erdogan, was allegedly shipping ISIS oil at discount rates.

Turkey’s active collaboration with ISIS slowed in 2015, as ISIS grew increasingly critical of Erdogan. The US launched air strikes against ISIS from Incirlik Air Force Base. In a reversal, ISIS media called Turkey an “apostate regime” aligned with “crusaders.”

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has not changed its core ideology. The AKP functions like a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc reproached women for laughing in public, referring to laughing or smiling as “moral corruption.”

US Approach

President Donald J. Trump is more willing to engage and accommodate than his predecessor. Despite voting irregularities during the referendum to amend the constitution (15 April 2017), Trump called to congratulate Erdogan and invited him for an official visit to the White House. Welcoming him, Trump said: “It’s a great honor and privilege — because he’s become a friend of mine — to introduce President Erdogan of Turkey. He’s running a very difficult part of the world. He’s involved very, very strongly and, frankly, he’s getting very high marks. And he’s also been working with the United States.”

In Erdogan’s 20-minute meeting with Trump (21 September 2017), Erdogan demanded that the US:

Extradite Fethullah Gulen whom he accused of masterminding the coup in July 2016.

Drop the charges against Reza Zarrab, the dual Iranian-Turkish national, arrested at Miami Airport and charged with money laundering that helped Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps evade sanctions to support nuclear activities.

Discontinue support for the Peoples Protection Units, insisting that the YPG and PKK are one and the same.

Other issues further complicate US-Turkey relations. Turkey bought S-400 missiles from Russia, paying $2.6 billion. The acquisition has strategic implications. Buying sophisticated weapons from Russia undermines the NATO principle of interoperability.

A US Grand Jury issued arrest warrants for nineteen of Erdogan’s bodyguards who beat US citizens outside the Turkish embassy in Washington (17 May 2017). In response, the US Congress voted overwhelmingly to censure Turkey and prohibited the sale of equipment for use by Erdogan’s security detail.

Turkey arrested US consular officials in September 2017, leading to a mutual ban on the issuance of non-immigrant visas by Turkey and the United States. The US partially lifted its visa ban as a gesture of goodwill prior to the visit of Prime Minister Binali Yildirim to Washington (8-9 November 2017).
Yildirim provided additional information to support Gulen’s extradition. It is, however, unlikely that the US will extradite. If it does, extradition requires a court order. Gulen has the right to appeal. Gulen knows a lot about Erdogan’s past activities. Gulen’s information would come out in a US court of law.
Reza Zarrab is cooperating with the prosecution, in exchange for lenient sentencing. He is a “jar of secrets” with intimate knowledge of Erdogan’s financial crimes. According to Zarrab, Erdogan signed off on the scheme. He “had given an order, for [Ziraat and Vakif banks] to start doing the trade.”

The Turkish Foreign Ministry reported that Trump promised to discontinue assistance to the YPG in a phone call with Erdogan (21 November 2017). The US disputes this report, indicating it will continue to cooperate with the Syrian Democratic Forces, including the YPG, until ISIS is vanquished.
Nonetheless, Kurds have reason for concern. Trump takes a transactional approach to politics and international relations. Though the YPG played a critical role liberating Raqqa, Trump might accede to Turkey’s demands, discontinue security assistance, and ultimately classify the YPG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. After Kirkuk, the YPG could be next for betrayal by the Trump administration.

Turkey is an outlier, out-of-step with European values. The post-coup crackdown revealed Erdogan’s inner Stalin. Today Turkey is a giant gulag. Zarrab’s testimony about Erdogan’s corruption is pushing Erdogan to intensify his crackdown on domestic opposition, which further erodes the appearance of democratic legitimacy and exacerbates an already volatile situation.

The rule of law means nothing in Turkey under Erdogan’s dictatorship. Turkey’s judiciary is corrupted and politicized, yet the European Court for Human Rights refuses to consider 25,000 pending cases pending until complainants have exhausted local remedies. The international community should help progressive Turks get rid of Erdogan. Only when Erdogan is removed can Turkey resume its constructive cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

* Remarks delivered by David L. Phillips to the EUTCC/European Parliament on 6 December 2017.

*David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert at the U.S. State Department under Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama. His recent book is An Uncertain Ally: Turkey under Erdogan’s Dictatorship.

 

 

 

Michael Flynn and the Turkish Connection

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By David L. Phillips/

When he started investigating General Michael T. Flynn, Special Counsel Robert Mueller concentrated on his income and undisclosed contacts with Russian officials. Now, however, Mueller’s investigation has broadened to include Flynn’s business with Turkey. Flynn faces possible fraud and money-laundering charges for failing to disclose a payment of $530,000 from the Turkish government. (The Foreign Agent Registration Act, FARA, requires disclosure of work for foreign governments, including details about compensation.) Flynn could also face conspiracy and kidnapping charges for allegedly negotiating a payment of $15 million to deliver to Turkey Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic cleric and political foe of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Gülen has lived in exile in the United States since 1999; he was granted permanent residence in 2008. The Turkish government accuses him of orchestrating the coup attempt in July 2016 and imprisoned thousands of his followers.

If indicted on these charges, Flynn could end up in jail for a long time. (Lawyers for Flynn have denied the kidnapping allegations, which were first reported by The Wall Street Journal.) Alternatively, Flynn and his son, Michael Flynn Jr., who works with him at the Flynn Intel Group, a lobbying firm in Virginia, can avoid jail time by becoming a cooperating witness in Mueller’s investigation. Flynn was an integral part of the Trump campaign and briefly served the Trump administration as national security adviser. If the Trump campaign colluded with Russians—for example, to coordinate the release of hacked emails embarrassing to Hillary Clinton and a social media campaign to influence voters—Flynn would probably know. Mueller has already brought charges against Trump’s former campaign manager, Paul Manafort, his associate Rick Gates, and a campaign foreign policy adviser, George Papadoupoulos. Flynn may be next.

Flynn has a history of cutting corners and breaking rules. Flynn failed to disclose income from three Russian companies, including a 2016 speaking fee of $45,000 from RT, an official propaganda arm of the Kremlin. He failed to disclose contact with Russia’s ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak, to FBI investigators conducting a background check to renew Flynn’s security clearance. Intercepts of Flynn’s phone calls with Kislyak reportedly showed that Flynn discussed sanctions on Russia and suggested the possibility of sanctions relief once Trump became president. Flynn also failed to disclose his involvement in a $100 billion nuclear energy deal, which he explored during an undisclosed trip to Israel and Egypt in 2015.

Flynn’s work for the Turkish government is also under investigation. The Flynn Intel Group was paid $530,000 by Inovo BV, a thinly capitalized Dutch company that serves as a front for Inovo Turkije, whose principal, Ekim Alptekin, is a close associate of President Erdoğan. Public records in the Netherlands confirmed that Inovo BV is a shell company. Flynn should have known that Inovo BV was a pass-through and, given Alptekin’s close relationship with Erdoğan, that Inovo BV’s funds originated from the Turkish government. Flynn hid the origins of the money and the fact that his payment was funneled through a third party. When details of the contract surfaced in press reports, Flynn acknowledged his service for the Turkish government by belatedly registering under FARA.

The contract with Inovo BV required Flynn to lobby on appropriations bills for the departments of State and Defense. Flynn’s duties also included keeping his client informed about “the transition between President Obama and President-Elect Trump.” In effect, Flynn was also hired to conduct a smear campaign of Gülen. In an article published by Flynn in The Hill on election day, November 8, 2016, Flynn referred to Gülen as a “shady Islamic mullah residing in Pennsylvania.” He wrote: “To professionals in the intelligence community, the stamp of terror is all over Mullah Gülen’s statements.… Washington is hoodwinked by this masked source of terror and instability nestled comfortably in our own backyard.” Flynn endorsed Turkey’s demand for extradition. “The forces of radical Islam derive their ideology from radical clerics like Gülen, who is running a scam. We should not provide him safe haven.”

Flynn was apparently willing to consider more drastic action. James Woolsey, a former director of the CIA, attended a meeting with Flynn in September 2016 during which Flynn discussed abducting Gülen and delivering him to Turkish authorities at the Imrali Island Prison off the coast of Turkey. The meeting was also attended by Berat Albayrak, Erdoğan’s son-in-law, and Turkey’s foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu. Woolsey described the proposed extradition outside of the US legal system as “a covert step in the dead of night to whisk this guy away.” He and Flynn were both working for the Trump campaign at the time.

Earlier this month, The Wall Street Journal reported that Flynn and his son rejoined discussions about Gülen at a meeting in December in New York at the 21 Club, where Flynn was offered as much as $15 million to deliver Gülen. The Turkish government denies that this meeting took place; Flynn’s lawyers also called the Journal report false. If the story is true, however, Flynn and his son could be prosecuted under the RICO law (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations).

Despite Flynn’s pattern of illegal and unethical behavior, President Trump took extraordinary steps to protect him. On February 14, 2017, Trump met with the then-FBI director, James Comey, in the Oval Office. “I hope you can let this go,” said Trump, alluding to Comey’s investigation of Flynn. Comey took it as an order, but did not comply. Trump fired Comey on May 9.

Trump had already fired, in March, Preet Bharara, the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Among the cases Bharara was pursuing was the prosecution of Reza Zarrab, a gold trader and Erdoğan crony charged with violating US sanctions on Iran. According to the indictment published shortly after Bharara was fired, Zarrab’s economic crimes involve illicit gold sales on behalf of the Iranian government, which were deposited into Turkey’s HalkBank; the proceeds helped support Iran’s nuclear program and business enterprises linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Mehmet Hakan Attila, a Halkbank executive, was also arrested, on charges of conspiring with Zarrab to evade US sanctions against Iran.

It is not unusual for an incoming president to replace US attorneys. But the manner and timing of Bharara’s dismissal raised red flags. Trump acted improperly toward Bharara,  initiating direct contact by calling Bharara three times. Bharara, who had jurisdiction to investigate suspected criminal conduct in business in New York, rightly refused to take the calls. Bharara believes that Trump would have asked him “to do something inappropriate,” had they spoken. Trump removed Bharara after having assured him in November 2016 that he would retain his job. Turkey has invested heavily in efforts to influence the US government, spending millions of dollars annually to hire former members of Congress as lobbyists, sponsoring junkets for members of Congress in the Turkey Caucus, and making large contributions to think-tanks such as the Atlantic Council. Was Turkey’s influence a factor in Trump’s decision to fire Bharara?

Erdoğan appears intensely interested in the Zarrab case, repeatedly asking US officials to drop the charges against him. An FBI source told me that the allegations against Zarrab include selling a ton of gold each week and taking a 15 percent commission. A superseding indictment filed by prosecutors in September charges that Zarrab conspired with senior Turkish government officials, including Erdoğan’s then-minister of the economy, in a scheme to dodge US sanctions on Iran that involved “laundering funds in connection with those illegal transactions, including millions of dollars in bribe payments.”

Zarrab hired Michael Mukasey, an attorney general in the George W. Bush administration, and Rudy Giuliani, a former Republican mayor of New York City and a notorious hard-liner on Iran, in March. According to Zarrab’s attorney, Benjamin Brafman, Giuliani and Mukasey were not hired to participate in Zarrab’s legal defense team; they were paid instead “to explore a potential disposition of the criminal charges”—in other words, to get the case closed down by influencing senior US government officials. That means, in effect, going over the head of prosecutors and bypassing the normal plea bargain channels—thereby undermining the administration of justice. Greenberg Traurig, Giuliani’s firm, is a registered agent for the Turkish government. Both Giuliani and Mukasey, who acted as advisers to the Trump campaign, appear to be cashing in on their connections to the White House.

The Zarrab case is a further example of Turkish efforts to circumvent the US legal system, but lobbying to get the charges dropped in the case has become a fool’s errand. Reports suggest that Zarrab recently agreed to act as a cooperating witness. Judicial interference, however, is part of an established pattern of conduct by Turkey, which has also become adept at buying influence in Washington. Turkey has many reasons for its largesse: it wants to deflect attention from its support to Syrian jihadis, official corruption, the killing of Kurds, and the systematic arrest of opponents under the guise of fighting terrorism.

The United States needs leadership that is steely-eyed toward Turkey as well as toward Russia. Yet Turkey’s influence-buying efforts are paying off. The Trump administration ignores Erdoğan’s human rights abuses and election irregularities. The White House turned a blind eye when Erdoğan’s security guards beat up US citizens outside the Turkish ambassador’s D.C. residence in May. The Trump administration was virtually silent when Turkey bought S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia for $2.6 billion. Trump calls Erdoğan “a friend of mine” and praises his job performance, saying: “He’s getting very high marks.” Trump has his own interests to think about—stakes in major real-estate developments in Istanbul, as well as in a luxury furniture company in Turkey.

Trump’s disparaging of the US justice system undermines judicial independence. He has already issued a controversial pardon for Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was convicted of disobeying a federal judge’s order. Knowing there is a potential presidential pardon in the works could dissuade Flynn from telling the truth as a cooperating witness. Efforts to subvert our democracy—by enemies foreign and domestic—may succeed unless the rule of law is fully and effectively applied in the case of Michael Flynn.
*David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert to the U.S. Department of State under Presidents Clinton Bush and Obama. His most recent book is An Uncertain Ally: Turkey under Erdogan’s Dictatorship.

ARE THE SYRIAN KURDS NEXT FOR BETRAYAL BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION?

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1 David L. Phillips

By David L. Phillips*/

Iraqi Kurds were attacked in Kirkuk by Iranian-backed Shiite militias on October 15. Despite decades of close cooperation between Iraqi Kurdistan and the United States, the U.S. abandoned Iraqi Kurds who, at America’s behest, have fought bravely against the Islamic State. Syrian Kurds fear they are next for betrayal by the Trump administration.

Abandoning the Syrian Kurds would be a flawed and short-sighted move. Flawed because the Peoples Protection Units (YPG), who number 40,000 men and women under arms, are proven and effective fighters against the Islamic State (ISIS). Short-sighted because it would align the United States with Iran and its allies in Baghdad and Damascus as primary partners in the coalition to defeat ISIS.

YPG fighters have served as America’s boots on-the-ground in Syria. They liberated Raqqa, the self-declared ISIS caliphate. U.S. Special Forces, weapons, and air power coordinated with the YPG and were invaluable.

Cooperation dates back to the battle for Kobani in October 2014. About 80 percent of Kobani, a Kurdish city in Northern Syria, had been seized by ISIS. Kobani’s heroic defenders were outmatched and almost out of ammunition. U.S. officials initially believed that Kobani had no strategic value, but they reconsidered. The Obama administration decided it would be a recruitment bonanza if Kobani fell and its defenders were beheaded for all the world to see. Turning the tide, the U.S. air lifted weapons to the YPG and bombed ISIS positions.

Recognizing the YPG’s battlefield prowess, America supported the YPG’s march against ISIS territory. The YPG seized the strategic border crossing at Tal-Abyad, preventing Turkey from sending weapons to ISIS in Raqqa. It secured the main road to Raqqa in June 2015. Then it took a border town in in northwestern Syria called Azaz, before pivoting towards Raqqa.

Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan was furious. He fumed, “Is it me who is your partner or the terrorists in Kobani?” Erdogan alleged that the YPG and the PKK were one and the same organization. Both Turkey and the United States consider the PKK a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). However, the State Department does not list the Democratic Union Party, the YPG’s political arm, as an FTO.

Over Erdogan’s objections, the Pentagon decided to provide heavy and offensive weapons directly to the YPG in May 2017. U.S. military commanders concluded that arming the YPG was the fastest way to take Raqqa. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) served as a fig leaf, engaging anti-Assad Arabs.

The decision was pivotal. On October 20, 2017, after 130 days of intense fighting, the YPG/SDF declared the “total liberation” of Raqqa. YPG ground forces paid a steep price. Since 2014, nearly four thousand YPG members died fighting ISIS. About a quarter of the casualties were women fighters.

U.S. Brigadier General Jonathan Braga praised “a highly effective, professional operation in a difficult urban area to free the city.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson extolled Raqqa’s liberation as a “new phase” in Syria.

Syrian Kurds are cautious. They fear that the new phase may be to their disadvantage. Is the Trump administration’s betrayal of Iraqi Kurds a harbinger of what may happen to them?

Syrian Kurds worry Washington could bend to Turkey’s demand and declare the YPG a terror group. In this event, the Pentagon would discontinue the supply of weapons and air power. U.S. Special Forces would withdraw. Abandoning the Syrian Kurds would further stain America’s standing. Moreover, it would be a strategic blunder. Without U.S. backing, Syrian Kurds could turn to Russia for protection or seek common cause with Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Cutting the Kurds loose would be interpreted by Turkey as a green light to invade Northern Syria in a bid to undermine “Rojava,” an autonomous area in the provinces of Afrin, Kobani, and Jazeera.

Kurds are uncertain. Can they trust the Trump administration? Is America’s cooperation simply expedient? The specter of betrayal will make Syrian Kurds and other partners think twice when called upon to fight and die for the United States.

*David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert to the U.S. Department of State under Presidents Clinton Bush and Obama. His most recent book is An Uncertain Ally: Turkey under Erdogan’s Dictatorship.

 

Iran is the Big Winner

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1 David L. Phillips

By David L. Phillips/

1 Iran

Iraq’s attack on Kirkuk was directed by Iran and coordinated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to Rudaw, a news outlet in Erbil, Iranian media revealed:“Chief of staff for Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mohamadi Gulpaigani, stated that the fall of Kirkuk was based on instructions from Ayatollah Khamenei that were carried out by the commander of the Quds Force in order to spoil an American-Israeli plan to create an independent Kurdistan in Iraq, dubbing it a second Israel in the Middle East.”

Iraq is a weak state that relies on security, diplomatic, and economic assistance from Iran. Premier Heider al-Abadi paid homage to Ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran just a few days after the Kirkuk operation. Khamenei warned of America’s “tricks”, admonishing: “You should never trust them.” Iran views America as the “Great Satan” and wants to limit U.S. influence in the region.

Khamenei disparaged America’s allies in Iraqi Kurdistan. He blasted its independence referendum an act of “sedition.” Iran fears that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan might destabilize Iran. It could inspire twelve million Kurds in Iran to demand greater autonomy.

Preventing Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence also advances Iran’s goal to pressure Israel. Iran has long wanted to establish a corridor of contiguous territory for supplying weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In turn, Hezbollah supplies Hamas, which launches rockets into Israel. The Kirkuk operation advanced the creation of a Shiite crescent, extending from Tehran to Baghdad, to Damascus, and Beirut.

Israel and Iraqi Kurdistan have common ground. For starters, both are surrounded by hostile Arab neighbors bent on their destruction.

In 2014, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cited “the collapse of Iraq” and endorsed “Kurdish aspirations for independence.” According to Netanyahu, “Kurds are a fighting people that has proved its political commitment, political moderation, and deserves political independence.” The late President Shimon Peres said, “The Kurds have, de facto, created their own state, which is democratic.”

Relations between Israel and Iraqi Kurdistan date back to the 1960s when Israel sought peripheral alliances with non-Arab states and peoples in the region. Israel trained Mustafa Barzani’s peshmerga. It offered the Kurds with technical expertise in water management and dry-land farming. It provided humanitarian assistance after the Gulf War of 1991.

Israel and Kurdistan developed commercial relations. Israel was the first customer of oil exported from Iraqi Kurdistan. At least 4 tankers delivered Kurdish oil from the Turkish port of Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon between January and June 2014.

They also established security cooperation. After the Islamic State attacked in 2014, Israel discreetly transferred weapons to Iraqi Kurdistan and provided intelligence. Kurdistan acted as a bulwark against Sunni Islamist extremism and a buffer against Iran’s regional ambitions.

Kurds are an important constituency within Israel. About 200,000 Jews of Kurdish descent live in Israel. Both the Jewish people and Kurds have survived attempts to exterminate them.

Israeli-Kurdistan cooperation was extensive, but it occurred below the radar. A Kurdish official told me that Kurdistan tries to be discreet. “We don’t want to offend anyone.”

The fall of Kirkuk to Iraqi security services and IRGC-backed Shiite militias sent shock waves through the region

Of course, the loss of Kirkuk most directly affects the Kurds. Their dream of independence deferred.

By abandoning the Kurds and turning a blind eye to Iran’s involvement, America’s reputation has been soiled. Washington’s singular focus on defeating ISIS has undermines broader U.S. strategic interests.

Israel loses Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential partner in the Middle East. Israel’s adversaries are emboldened.

Iran and Hezbollah are the big winners. With America’s demise in the region, Iran now has the potential to project its power unchecked in the region.

David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert to the U.S. Department of State under Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama.