Elez Biberaj*/
Thirty-five years after Albania’s emergence from one of Europe’s most repressive communist regimes, the country’s democratic trajectory remains emblematic of post-authoritarian transformation, reflecting the promise of political renewal while exposing the challenges of durable consolidation. In this context, the May 2025 parliamentary elections stand out as a test of Albania’s resilience and a measure of its capacity to translate reform dynamics into democratic practice.
Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialist Party secured a sweeping victory, winning 83 of 140 parliamentary seats, while the opposition, led by Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party, suffered a significant setback with only 50 seats. International observers judged the elections technically well-administered, yet emphasized the deeply polarized environment and uneven playing field. ODIHR’s final report cited misuse of state resources, vote buying, intimidation of opposition supporters, and unequal media access. These irregularities highlight the persistent vulnerabilities of Albania’s political order.
In the coming years, and particularly over the next four-year mandate, Albania’s democratic trajectory will hinge on whether reform momentum can be sustained while systemic constraints are addressed. This interplay provides the framework for assessing Rama’s record of achievements and the broader dynamics of power and fragility that define Albania’s political landscape.
Rama’s Record of Achievements
Rama begins an unprecedented fourth term with a commanding mandate, presenting his victory as a historic opportunity to advance judicial reform, administrative modernization, and Albania’s accession to the European Union.
Over the past decade, Albania has undergone significant transformations, experiencing steady economic growth with GDP averaging around 4 percent in recent years, a reduction in poverty, and the expansion of tourism. Infrastructure projects – from highways and energy connectivity to port modernization – have reshaped the country’s economic landscape. Judicial reforms, particularly the vetting of judges and prosecutors, have strengthened the credibility of the justice system, while administrative reforms have streamlined governance. These efforts have earned Albania international recognition and positioned Rama as an influential regional statesman.
Building on these accomplishments, Rama aims to prepare the country for full EU membership by 2030. The European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Report praised Albania’s reform drive and signaled that EU membership within the next five years is a realistic goal. This optimism reflects not only domestic reforms but also Albania’s foreign policy posture. As a NATO member since 2009, Albania has maintained a proactive role in alliance operations and regional security, while aligning closely with EU foreign and security policy. Albania is seen as a frontrunner in accession negotiations, having advanced through a significant number of negotiating chapters.
Rama’s fourth term is guided by the government plan approved by parliament in September 2025, which sets EU accession as Albania’s strategic anchor. The plan prioritizes closing all negotiating chapters by 2027, deepening rule of law and anti-corruption reforms, strengthening media freedom and institutional resilience, and modernizing public administration.
Nonetheless, democracy assessments highlight persistent fragility. Freedom House continues to classify Albania as “partly free,” and the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks it as a “hybrid regime.” Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Albania 80th globally, a modest improvement over previous years, but still among the most corrupt in Europe. These assessments underscore that Albania’s democratic institutions, while showing reform momentum, continue to exhibit structural fragility.
Power Consolidated, Democracy Eroded
Rama’s consolidation of power is unprecedented, extending across nearly all levers of governance at both national and local levels. His leadership style – a blend of charismatic command, media-savvy messaging, and tight executive control – has proven effective in mobilizing support and sustaining political momentum. But beneath this consolidation lies a fragile framework of governance, hollowed by personalized decision-making, weakened institutions, corruption, media influence, and entrenched clientelism.
Rama governs in a highly insulated environment, where limited transparency and weakened accountability define the political landscape. Decision-making has become highly personalized, with parliament reduced to a rubber-stamp and the Socialist Party functioning largely as an extension of his authority. Debate is minimal, consultations rare, and dissent actively discouraged. Most recently, the government’s program and cabinet were approved without parliamentary discussion. Cabinet appointments were made unilaterally, with ministers reportedly learning of their roles during Rama’s public addresses. Genuine political competition has eroded, as a divided opposition struggles to remain relevant.
Although personalization of power may expedite legislation and streamline decision-making, it magnifies the risk of executive overreach and erodes the principle of collective governance – the idea that authority should be shared, deliberative, and accountable.
Political unaccountability has deepened the country’s socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Institutions remain ill-equipped to address poverty, inequality, and the exodus of human capital. Albania remains one of Europe’s poorest countries, with more than one-fifth of the population living below the relative poverty line. Wealth is concentrated among a narrow elite tied to political and business networks, while healthcare and education remain underfunded and unevenly distributed. Persistent underinvestment has widened the skills gap and accelerated brain drain, with some 700,000 Albanians, mostly young professionals, emigrating in the past fifteen years.
These socioeconomic vulnerabilities are compounded by corruption, which has further eroded institutional credibility. Rama’s administration has entrenched a system of political favoritism, opaque contracting, and elite enrichment. The fusion of political and economic interests has fostered a kleptocratic dynamic, enabling systemic graft, opening the door for organized crime to penetrate state institutions, and weakening judicial and media independence.
Public tenders and infrastructure projects have frequently served as vehicles for rent-seeking, enriching senior officials and networks close to the government. High-profile scandals involving figures such as Saimir Tahiri, Arben Ahmetaj, Ilir Beqja, Lefter Koka, Erion Veliaj, and Belinda Balluku reveal a broader pattern of elite misconduct. In September, Rama reappointed Balluku as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, the cabinet’s second most important post, despite persistent allegations of corruption. Following her indictment for allegedly rigging public tenders in the Llogara Tunnel project, he dismissed calls for her resignation, signaling a readiness to shield loyalists even at the expense of institutional credibility. That stance proved a precarious, self-inflicted wound: the Special Court for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime dismissed Balluku from her post – a humiliating outcome that exposes Rama’s inability to act decisively, even in cases that can turn into a boomerang against his own leadership.
Balluku and other high-profile cases cast doubt on Rama’s professed commitment to clean governance and highlight the inescapable burden of his political responsibility. These cases are not isolated; they reflect a broader pattern that underscores a culture of impunity at the highest levels of government, where senior officials exploit public office for personal gain. Misconduct has become normalized, with accountability mechanisms steadily weakened. While Rama has consistently denied personal wrongdoing, as prime minister he bears responsibility to uphold accountability, confront misconduct among senior officials, and ensure democratic standards are not compromised. Ultimately, the buck stops with him.
Organized crime has also embedded itself in Albania’s formal economy, particularly in construction, tourism, and real estate. The 2025 Organized Crime Index underscores Albania’s vulnerability, citing entrenched criminal networks and state-embedded actors. The European Commission’s annual progress report highlights persistent weaknesses in rule of law, corruption, and governance, underscoring the fragility of Albania’s institutions despite reform efforts. Construction permits and real estate projects are frequently linked to opaque financing and criminal networks, illustrating how enforcement remains weak and selective. The paradox is stark: Rama’s tight grip on power has become bound to the system itself. If he confronts the entrenched corrupt interests within it, he risks shaking the very foundation of his own rule.
These patterns of corruption and state capture are reinforced by a media landscape that is coopted and constrained, further narrowing civic space and weakening public scrutiny.
Despite a formally pluralistic landscape, the media often mirrors partisan narratives. This stems from a toxic mix of political cooptation, concentrated ownership, and intimidation tactics. Rama has cultivated influence over key outlets through patronage and proximity to proprietors. His frequent attacks on journalists, often laced with derision and threats, have chilled reporting and further restricted scrutiny. Many media owners, businessmen benefiting from state contracts, act as proxies, securing favorable coverage and suppressing damaging stories. As a result, leading platforms remain fixated on opposition dysfunction, while institutionalized misconduct under Rama receives little sustained analysis. Even during crises, talk shows with ostensibly independent voices often sidestep scrutiny of the ruling party, spotlighting opposition missteps instead. This pattern, under the veneer of independence, reveals a deeper alignment between political power and media influence. Selective framing distorts public discourse and indirectly facilitates executive consolidation by deflecting attention from abuses and weakening institutional checks.
Civic disengagement further deepens Albania’s institutional erosion. Society appears increasingly fragmented, marked by low civic engagement and rising political apathy. Leading intellectuals and scholars, research institutions, and the Academy of Sciences, remain largely peripheral to national debate. Their input is vital to fostering critical discourse and evidence-based policymaking.
At the same time, Rama has benefited from declining international scrutiny. With global attention diverted to democratic backsliding and crises elsewhere, Albania’s internal governance failures have attracted less sustained pressure from key partners and watchdogs. This vacuum has enabled the prime minister to consolidate power with fewer external constraints, even as corruption, organized crime, media control, and civic apathy intensify.
Entrenched Elites, Democratic Stagnation
Albania’s political system has ossified, eroding institutional capacity, stifling renewal, and constraining democratic choice. Politics remains dominated by the Socialist Party and a weakened Democratic opposition, with access to power tightly guarded and fresh alternatives systematically obstructed. Patronage networks and elite entrenchment sustain a stagnant political system, while the success of Albania’s younger generation abroad highlights the wasted potential at home. Emigration has drained human capital, deepening inertia and widening the gap between societal dynamism and political stagnation.
In view of growing authoritarian tendencies and the erosion of institutional checks, Albania’s democratic future demands a broad reckoning and mobilization across political, institutional, and societal spheres, transforming governance, accountability, and civic culture. This requires a systemic shift: political parties offering credible alternatives, a reinvigorated civil society, engaged intellectual voices, and a participatory citizenry – above all, a younger generation ready to act as agents of change.
Both major parties now face crises of regeneration, albeit in different ways: the Democratic Party through fragmentation and exhaustion, and the Socialist Party through over-centralization and conformity.
This crisis of stagnation is most visible in the Democratic Party, which confronts a pivotal reckoning. Missteps in recent years – the failure to participate in the debate on territorial administrative changes, withdrawal from parliament and boycott of local elections – left it marginalized. The U.S. designation of Sali Berisha as persona non grata, followed by his legal troubles and house arrest, deepened internal strife and eroded credibility. Although the party competed in an electoral environment heavily tilted against it, the results revealed a deeper truth: its message failed to resonate. Its rhetoric, leadership style, and political vision appear increasingly out of step with the aspirations of the electorate.
Today, the Democratic Party survives largely on the strength of Berisha’s personal endurance and legacy. His charisma and historical stature continue to command loyalty, but they cannot substitute for a coherent program or a future-facing agenda. Without bold reimagining – internal democracy, new voices, and a compelling vision – the party risks being perceived as a relic of its past rather than a vehicle for democratic relevance. Berisha remains one of the most consequential figures in Albania’s post-communist history: the country’s first democratic president, a two-term prime minister, and a resilient opposition leader. Now, he has the opportunity to conclude his public career by stepping into the role of elder statesman and paving the way for new leadership. By guiding a transparent and competitive transition, he can help ensure that the party’s future is shaped not by loyalty to a single figure, but by open debate, merit, and vision.
In the final analysis, no leader, however consequential, can indefinitely carry the burden of sustaining a party’s standing – its credibility, relevance, and position within the political landscape. Delaying the inevitable day of reckoning will only prolong the Democratic Party’s agony, deepening internal paralysis, eroding public trust, and making the eventual leadership transition more fraught and costly.
While Berisha’s departure could trigger factional battles and short-term instability, it is more likely to galvanize the opposition, unlocking the energy and talent long stifled. The Democratic Party already has promising younger members whose potential has been overshadowed by internal strife and the dominance of entrenched leadership. With space to flourish, they could help reshape the party’s future. At the same time, the Democratic Party must broaden its base by attracting new members and voices, ensuring revitalization is not confined to generational turnover but rooted in inclusive participation. With local elections in 2027 and national elections in 2029, the party has a critical window to regroup and rebuild.
Renewal must also begin within the ruling Socialist Party, where loyalty has replaced accountability and internal pluralism has given way to uniformity. Ironically, the party was more internally democratic under Fatos Nano in the 1990s than it is today. The Socialist Party must confront the dangers of one-man rule and rediscover its institutional character, fostering genuine policy debate and tolerating dissent.
This narrowing of internal pluralism is mirrored in the broader political landscape, where thirty-five years after the fall of communism, no credible alternatives have emerged to challenge the dominance of the two major parties. Following his arrest on corruption charges, former President Ilir Meta’s party has largely disintegrated, leaving Albania’s political landscape monopolized by Socialists and Democrats.
The absence of alternatives underscores not only systemic stagnation and the narrowing of democratic choice, but also the urgency of opening pathways for new actors. Albania’s younger generation has proven its capacity for innovation abroad, yet remains stifled at home. To take the helm, this generation must channel its skills into civic engagement, grassroots organizing, and the creation of new political platforms that reflect their lived realities. Universities, professional networks, and diaspora connections can incubate leadership, helping young Albanians turn experience abroad into reform at home. Harnessing this potential through civic movements and institutional renewal could spark regeneration. Without such change, Albania risks becoming a nation rich in talent but constrained by political inertia. Its democracy would benefit greatly from new, modern political forces with platforms that speak to the realities of a generation born after communism, rather than remaining bound to the legacies of the past.
Yet the urgency of renewal extends beyond parties to the foundations of democratic life itself. The country’s future cannot hinge solely on the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, or any single political actor. What is required is a renewal that engages citizens, civil society, media, and international partners to ensure accountability and foster civic participation. Together, these pillars form the foundation of democratic reinvigoration, but each is fragile and requires long-term investment
Albania faces a deepening crisis of civic participation. Voter turnout in May 2025 fell to just 41 percent, with sharp declines among young voters, underscoring disillusionment and a sense that participation carries little weight. At the same time, civil society has seen its role as watchdog and catalyst for reform steadily eroded by funding constraints, political pressure, and public apathy. Empowering the youngest generation requires institutional reforms that make participation meaningful, educational initiatives that foster civic literacy, and platforms that amplify youth voices. Equally, civil society must reclaim its space in public discourse, defend institutional autonomy, and mobilize citizens around accountability and justice. Revitalized civic participation can reawaken the democratic conscience of the nation and serve as a counterweight to executive dominance, but its vulnerability demands sustained commitment.
A free and independent media is equally indispensable to democratic reinvigoration. Reforms must ensure transparency, protect journalists, and invest in public-interest reporting. Only an empowered media can hold power to account. Yet here too, feasibility is uncertain: entrenched political influence and concentrated ownership make reform difficult, even as the need for scrutiny grows more urgent.
Finally, the international community, particularly the European Union, remains critical. Conditionality is one of the few remaining levers for reform, but it must be applied with clarity and conviction. Support should be contingent not on the perfunctory compliance evident today, but on demonstrable progress in judicial independence, electoral integrity, and media freedom. Albania’s path to Europe must be paved with democratic substance, not symbolic gestures.
Conclusion
Albania’s democratic experiment confronts both peril and possibility. Concentrated executive power, weakened institutions, marginalized opposition, and civic apathy have created conditions for authoritarian consolidation. Yet the possibility of democratic renewal remains within reach. Albania faces a stark choice: authoritarian entrenchment, patronage networks, and civic withdrawal, or democratic renewal through pluralism, institutional independence, and meaningful citizen participation.
With his overwhelming electoral victory, Rama holds unparalleled leverage to shape Albania’s trajectory. While his unchallenged position could suggest that he has little incentive to change course, the country’s formidable challenges and the fragile credibility of its EU aspirations require a correction in leadership style, away from authoritarian, kleptocratic tendencies that undermine Albania’s democratic foundations. How he chooses to wield his power will, to a large degree, define not only the trajectory of Albania’s democracy but also his legacy. Before assuming office in 2013, he cultivated the image of a visionary, forward-looking leader, pledging to establish the rule of law, revitalize institutions, ensure free and fair elections, and safeguard media freedoms. It would be a paradox if he were ultimately remembered as the hopeful democrat turned embodiment of unchecked authority, who chose authoritarian consolidation over democratic renewal.
The same dominance that grants Rama such latitude also exposes the fragility of the system he presides over. His concentration of power has produced a governance model that appears formidable but rests on brittle foundations, proving less stable than it appears. The paradox of his rule is that while he can consolidate power with ease, the system’s durability is far less assured. Without credible checks and institutional resilience, Albania’s political order remains vulnerable to shocks, whether from waning popularity, intensifying dissent, or shifting alliances among entrenched interests.
This reality underscores the imperative for other forces to step forward. Albania’s future cannot be decided by Rama alone. The resilience of institutions, the renewal of political parties, the vitality of civil society, the engagement of youth, and the principled stance of strategic partners are equally decisive. If these stakeholders rise to the challenge, Albania can move beyond authoritarian drift and extractive governance, laying the foundations for democratic resilience. The task is urgent, but achievable. By mobilizing its democratic assets, Albania can turn fragility into strength, transform obstacles into opportunities, and fulfill its long-held democratic aspirations.
The Albanians deserve nothing less than a democracy genuine in substance, dignified in spirit, and firmly anchored in Europe.
*Presentation at the national convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), Washington, D.C., November 22, 2025.
