Dielli | The Sun

Albanian American Newspaper Devoted to the Intellectual and Cultural Advancement of the Albanians in America | Since 1909

MARRËDHËNIET NDËRETNIKE SHQIPTARO- SERBE

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Nikë Gashaj, Politolog/

Shikuar historikisht, shqiptarët në bashkësinë shtetërore me Serbinë kanë kaluar periudha shumë të vështira në luftën e tyre për liri e drejtësi, për të drejtat njerëzore dhe kombëtare – kundër regjimeve borgjeze, diktaturave monarkiste, politikave nacionaliste, shoviniste dhe fashiste të Aleksadër Rankoviqit dhe Sllobodan Millosheviqit.

Pra, historia e shqiptarëve nuk është e varfër në ngjarje, por është e mbushur me luftë për mbijetesë, vuajtje të padëgjuara, ngjarje dramatike dhe tragjike. Prandaj, kur flitet për marrëdhëniet ndëretnike shqiptaro-Serbe në Jugosllavi, respektivisht në Serbin e Madhe, duhet të kihet parasysh tërë dramën, tërë udhtimin e shqiptarëve në bashkësinë me Serbinë.

Serbia si shtet okupues dhe agresor, ka kryer tre gjenocide mbi shqiptarët. Gjenocidi i parë u krye me 1878 në Kurshumli, Leskovac, Prokuple, Topllicë, Vranje dhe Nish. Gjenocidi i dytë u krye gjatë luftërave Ballkanike të viteve 1912-1913 dhe gjenocidi  i tret,  gjatë agresionit ushtarako-policor serb mbi popullin  shqiptar të pa mbrojtur, duar thatë, në vitet   1998/99, në Kosovë.

Ekziston një literaturë voluminoze dhe një material historik-politik për jetën e vështirë dhe të padurueshme, si dhe për pozicionin  e nënshtrimit e të shtypjes  së shqiptarëve nën sovranitetin dhe jurisprudencën serbe. Por me këtë rast do të citoj disa vlerësime dhe qendrime të një socialdemokrati, publicisti dhe humanisti të mirënjohur serb, Dimitrije Tucoviq, i cili thotë: ”Sot është berë shumë e rrezikshme të predikosh nevojën për të punuar së bashku me Arbanasit. Mendime të pavërteta dhe tendencioze, si dhe politka pushtuese e Serbisë me metodat e saj barbare duhej të mbushte Arbanasit me urrejtje të thedhë ndaj nesh…”

Gjithashtu, është i njohur rasti kur deputeti Kosta Novakoviq ngriti çështjen e terrorit dhe presionit fizik ndaj popullatës së pafajshme shqiptare nga regjimi serb në Mbretërinë e Jugosllavisë, por u sulmua fizikisht dhe u rrah nga deputetët pozicionar serbë në vetë Parlamentin.

Pikërisht për shkak të pozicionit skllav, një pjesë e madhe e shqiptarëve e mirëpriti ardhjen  e trupave Italiane, me 1941, në Jugosllavi të cilët i konsideruan  si çlirimtare. Njerëzit atëherë thoshin”Le të vijë edhe djalli i Zi, thjesht le të ndryshoj kjo qeveri, sepse nuk mund të jetë më e keqe për ne”. Dhe sigurisht, ata kishin të drejtë.

Shqiptarët nën regjimin italian në Jugosllavi gëzonin të drejta të konsiderueshme civile dhe kombëare, të cilat ishin të paimagjinueshme nën sundimin serb. Për shembull, shqiptarët ishin të lirë të përdorin gjuhën dhe alfabetin e tyre si gjuhë zyrtare, së bashku me italishten; lëjohej përdorimi i flamurit kombëtar shqiptar; ishte e lëjuar përdorimi Himnit shqiptar; janë hapur një numër i madh i shkollave fillore dhe të mesme në gjuhën shqipe; u krijuan mundësi që shqiptarët të punësohen në administratën shtetërore;  një numri të shqiptarëve iu kthye toka e uzurpuar nga pushteti serb, etj.

Për më tepër vendosjen e regjimit politik italian, shqiptarët e përjetuan atë si çlirim nga persekutimi, arrestimi, vrasja dhe dëbimi në botën e jashtme. Me një fjalë, si çlirim nga pozicioni kolonial, nga presioni, terrori dhe gjenocidi. Kjo është vetëm si sintezë e shkurt e historisë tragjike të shqiptarëve në ish-Jugosllavi, apo Serbi,  por gjithashtu më duket se është mjaftë bindëse në paraqitjen e marrëdhënieve ndëretnike shqiptaro-serbe.

KOSOVO’S KLECKA WAR CRIMES TRIALWAS NO JOKE

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A former EU rule-of-law mission chief judge was wrong to claim that the case against Kosovo guerrillas accused of abusing prisoners at the wartime Klecka jail was weak, writes judge Dean B. Pineles, who served on the trial panel.

BY DEAN B. PINELES-WASHINGTON DC*-BIRN/

On July 12, judge Malcolm Simmons, who was the president of the Assembly of Judges for the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, from 2014 to 2017, presented testimony by video link before a committee of the Kosovo Assembly in which he made a series of serious allegations against EULEX, including politicisation of criminal trials under the mission’s jurisdiction.

I served as an American international criminal judge with EULEX for 28 months, from February 2011 through May 2013. I was also a member of the trial panel on the first Klecka war crimes case from 2011-12 (and the first Medicus case from 2011-13), and I wish to respond to judge Simmons’s highly incorrect comments about Klecka for the sake of historical accuracy.First, let me say that before judge Simmons was elevated to the presidency of the Assembly of Judges, he was also serving in the same capacity as an international criminal judge from the United Kingdom. I sat with him on the trial panel in a murder case in Prizren in 2011, and found his participation to be highly professional.

I never worked with him again on another case, but we were both members of the relatively small cadre of international judges, and I would consider him a friend.

I have no personal knowledge about his allegations against EULEX, and will leave him to his proof. But I do wish to challenge his characterisation of the Klecka case, which was one of the most high-profile cases prosecuted by EULEX. In the YouTube video of his presentation, he makes several sweeping statements which are completely contrary to my experience with the case.

Simmons says that the case never should have gone to trial because the evidence was so weak; that no country in the world would proceed with such a case; that there was little chance of success; and that in the United Kingdom, the case would have been “laughed out of court”.

He also says that the case was politically motivated and, despite its weakness, was tried only because a conviction against Kosovo Liberation Army soldiers and commanders would support the EU-mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade to normalise relations, a paramount goal of EULEX.

I disagree strongly with this characterisation. In my opinion, the case presented to the trial panel on which I sat was entirely worthy of a full trial, both legally and factually.

The Klecka case began in 2009 when Agim Zogaj, a former guard at the KLA’s Klecka prison camp in the late 1990s, went to the police and told them that he had kept a secret diary of the comings and goings of all the prisoners (Serbs and Albanian collaborators).

Zogaj alleged that prisoners’ treatment was inhumane, and that several of them had been executed on the orders of Fatmir Limaj, the camp commander, who went on to become a major political figure in Kosovo after the war.

Over time, Zogaj provided numerous additional statements to the police and prosecutor as they conducted their investigation, all of which were consistent. His statements concerning the executions, including the use of a scythe as a murder weapon, was corroborated by forensic evidence including exhumations.

There were also other witnesses and documents corroborating portions of Zogaj’s statements, although he was the only one who could identify the perpetrators.

In the summer of 2011, after the intensive investigation had been completed, but before the indictment was filed, the prosecutor made Zogaj available for examination under oath by the defence attorneys representing the ten individuals who were being investigated, including Limaj.

Zogaj was questioned over four days for a total of 19 hours and was asked over 1,000 questions. His answers were consistent with each other and with his prior statements, all of which had been provided to defence counsel.

The prosecutor then filed the indictment alleging various war crimes based on the above, and the indictment was independently confirmed by a EULEX judge, meaning that there was a legal and factual basis to proceed to trial.

Zogaj was then placed in the witness protection programme and was from then on known as Witness X. Tragically, he committed suicide by hanging in Germany shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin in November 2011.

He was under immense pressure from both the prosecution and the defence, and was desperate to find a way out to protect his family

I was a member of the trial panel, along with the presiding judge from the United Kingdom (not judge Simmons) and a Kosovo judge.

As the trial commenced, the court had to decide whether Zogaj’s statements, sworn testimony and diary were admissible in evidence now that he was unavailable as a witness.

Under the applicable law, this depended on whether defence counsel had been given an adequate opportunity to confront and question him before he died. There was no automatically correct answer under the law, and Zogaj’s mere unavailability did not necessarily decide the question.

This legal issue was the subject of intense debate during several heated sessions in the courtroom, which was packed with the defendants’ supporters; the tension was palpable. Indeed, the presiding judge and I had to travel back and forth to the courthouse in an armored vehicle.

The defence attorneys argued that the questioning was inadequate and that they would be denied the right to cross-examine Zogaj during the actual trial in light of all the other evidence that might be admitted, including defence evidence.

Dissenting opinion

Following the hearings on this legal issue, the three of us on the trial panel had to decide the outcome.

We debated the matter back and forth at length in our chambers. The presiding judge and the Kosovo judge were persuaded by the defence arguments and determined that Zogaj’s evidence was inadmissible.

They then voted to acquit the defendants, who could not be convicted without Zogaj’s evidence.

However, I was not persuaded and issued a 23-page dissenting opinion, dated March 26, 2012, as authorised under the code of criminal procedure.

My reasoning was not that the defendants were guilty, but that the evidence was admissible and was likewise sufficient to warrant a trial on its merits. My decision was supported by relevant case law from the European Court of Human Rights. The written decision was then placed in the court file, not to be disclosed except to the Supreme Court on appeal. (A copy is available here.)

At a subsequent hearing in the spring of 2012, the verdicts of acquittal were announced by the presiding judge to the jubilation of the defendants and the outrage of the prosecutor, who immediately appealed.

Then, significantly, in November 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the acquittals and remanded the case for a new trial, and in so doing, adopted much of the reasoning in my dissenting opinion. It also determined that Zogaj’s evidence was admissible.

The case was then retried, judge Simmons presiding, and the defendants were found not guilty. This verdict was ultimately upheld in another decision by the Supreme Court.

While I have no quarrel with this outcome, since it was based on a full examination of all the evidence at trial, not merely on a pre-trial evaluation, it does not negate the fact that the original indictment had clear viability when it was originally presented to the trial panel as determined by the first decision of the Supreme Court. It was hardly “laughable”.

While I can’t address judge Simmons’ motives in making these outlandish statements, it could be that he wishes to undermine the validity of the case in order to support his narrative that it was prosecuted only for political reasons and not because of its merit.

While I have no personal knowledge of the machinations of the EULEX officials who wanted a conviction in the case, either in Kosovo or Brussels, I can state unequivocally for myself that I was never subjected to pressure by anyone even though I was the one who voted to proceed with the trial.

This includes officials in the US embassy in Pristina, with whom I intentionally had virtually no contact during my tenure in Kosovo in order to remain totally independent.

Indeed, if I had been pressured for political reasons, I would have rejected it out of hand. And it is unlikely that the presiding judge and the Kosovo judge were pressured to convict, since they voted to acquit.

Judge Dean B. Pineles is a graduate of Brown University, Boston University Law School and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He served as an international judge with EULEX from 2011-13. In addition to Kosovo, he has extensive rule of law experience in Russia, Kazakhstan and Georgia, and is writing a book about his experiences in these countries.

*The opinions expressed are those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.

ÇFARË NDODH NË KABUL KA TË BËJË EDHE ME NEVE

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Nga ANGELO PANEBIANCO-Perktheu per Diellin-Eugjen MERLIKA/

Kabuli si Saigoni? Më 1975, mbasi kishin dalë të mundur nga një luftë tepër e gjatë, amerikanët  ishin tërhequr. Regjimi komunist i Vietnamit të Veriut, mbasi theu qëndresën e dobët të vietnamitëve jugorë, zotëroi Saigonin, kryeqytetin e Jugut.

Pasojat e atij dështimi do të ishin shfaqur gjithandej. Pesë vitet pasuese do të shihnin Bashkimin Sovjetik në sulm shumë ballor nga Afrika n’Amerikën Latine, n’Evropë: kjo e fundit do të vihej nën trysni të sovjetikëve në rrafshin ushtarak (me vendosjen e raketave SS20 të drejtuara). Thyerja në Vietnam, duke lajmëruar botën se Amerika ishte atëherë më e dobët, do të kishte për Evropën edhe të tjera pasoja. Do t’i jepte më tepër fuqi ndjenjave kundëramerikane që, në kontinentin e vjetër ishin një trashëgimi e lëvizjeve studentore të fundit të viteve gjashtëdhjetë. Ishte epoka  në të cilën në Francë e veçanërisht n’Itali, partitë komuniste bëheshin më të forta nga ana zgjedhore. Në sajë të humbjes në Vietnam, së cilës i shtoheshin kriza ekonomike dhe skandali i Watergate-tit, Amerika dukej se ishte në një fazë rënieje të shpejtuar e të pakthyeshme. Për të lidhur atë të shkuar me të tashmen tonë kujtojmë dhe një tjetër thyerje përvëluese amerikane të atherëshme: revolucioni komeinist në Iran më 1979, i pasuar nga bëma poshtëruese e pengjeve të Ambasadës amerikane në Teheran.

Vetëm kur do të bëhej president Ronald Reagan më 1981, era do të ndërronte drejtim, Amerika do të rimerrte nismat, do të fillonte të kundërshtonte fuqishëm dredhitë e Bashkimit Sovjetik në fushat e ndryshme e më së fundi  do t’a thyente.

Sot rrethanat janë mjaft të ndryshme por duhet shumë sipërfaqësi për të besuar se nëse talebanët do të merrnin gjithë Afganistanin si vazhdim i tërheqjes amerikane, kjo do të kishte pasoja (sigurisht të tmerrshme, siç e dimë të gjithë) vetëm për afganët. T’a zemë se Afganistani nuk do të bëhet si shumë Shtete të dështuara, teatër i një përplasjeje, të paracaktuar të zgjasë me vite të tëra ndërmjet një shumësie tarafesh të financuara nga rusët, nga turqit, nga iranianët etj. t’a zemë se me të vërtetë talebanët arrijnë të bëhen përsëri zotër të gjithë Vendit. Do të zbulojmë se Kabuli është shumë më pranë nesh nga sa mendojmë. Sepse një fitore talebane n’Afganistan do të kishte jehona miratuese në të gjithë galaktikën e skajshmërisë islamike, do të elektrizonte të gjitha kokat e nxehta në qarkullim nga Indonezia në Tunizi, nga Afrika Subsahariane n’Evropë. Do të bëhej një instrumet i fuqishëm propagande dhe rekrutimesh për Al Qaedën, Shtetin islamik, dhe të gjithë grupet terroriste të birësuar, “prova” që  të pafetë mund të thyhen e të nënështrohen gjithkund. Biden-i dhe bashkëpuntorët e tij e kanë menduar këtë? Sigurisht që po, por për çastin sillen sikur ajo gjë nuk ka të bëjë me ta.

Sigurisht, ka të bëjë me ne evropianët, shumë më tepër të vënë në pah ndaj sfidës islamiste se amerikanët. Kërcënimet Italisë së këtyre ditëve (“do të marrim Romën”) për fat të keq nuk janë folklor apo një shaka vdekësore: ekstremizmi islamik ushqehet nga një ndërpretim i fesë së tij për të cilën “Roma kryqtare” dhe Italia domosdoshmërisht do të bëhen shpejt a vonë një territor i islamit. Por e gjithë Evropa është tokë pushtimi.

Kemi qënë shumë që morëm frymë thellë kur Trump-i u mund nga Biden-i. Presidenti i mëparshëm, me sulmet e tij kundrejt Evropës po e coptonte gjithshka që mbetej nga aleanca perëndimore. Kemi qënë shumë duke thënë: më së fundi, me Biden-in Amerika u kthye. Tani është koha të fillojmë të pyesim veten: ku po shkon saktësisht Amerika? 

Mbi të gjitha sa mund të mbështetemi ne evropianët mbi ndihmesën amerikane përballë kërcënimeve më të rënda për sigurinë tonë?

Përparësia amerikane, është mjaft e qartë, është shemëria me Kinën për parësinë ndërkombëtare. Kjo përsiat zhvendosjen e bariqendrës së pushtetit botëror nga Atllantiku në Paqësor. Biden-i, është e vërtetë se po përballet me Putinin, po i thotë qartë se amerikanët nuk do t’u lejojnë rusëve të tjera Krimera. Dhe është gati t’i përgjigjet çdo goditjeje nëse agresionet e vazhdueshme e tashmë shumë të rënda të hackerve rusë kundrejt institucioneve perëndimore (ndërmarrje, zyrat shtetërore, etj) nuk do të ndërpriten. Kjo është një gjë shumë e mirë për Evropën. Është e qartë edhe se Biden-i, i zotuar në një garë fuqije me Kinën, është i gatshëm të bisedojë për një marrëveshje me Putinin, nëse ky i fundit do të tregohej i arsyeshëm. Edhe kjo shkon mirë. Por ka një por. Në marrëveshjen e mundëshme a do të bëjë pjesë edhe pranimi nga ana amerikane i pozitave, tashmë të fituara, nga rusët në Libi e në përgjithësi në Mesdhe? Ky, natyrisht do t’ishte një lajm shumë i keq për ne evropianët.

Çfarë ka ndërmënd të bëjë Administrata amerikane për të kundërshtuar politikën neo – imperialiste të sulltanit Erdogan në Libi e në Vënde të tjera? Do të lejojë që Mesdheu të kthehet në një det ruso-turk? 

Së fundi, nëse, siç është e mundur, mbasi të ketë rënë Kabuli, skajshmëria islamike, që sot mjaft e fuqishme në Sahel e në vënde të tjera, do të fuqizohej akoma më shumë, administrata do t’a quante të mjaftueshme veprimin e kundërshtimit që ushtron sot në Afrikë dhe në Lindjen e Mesme (me dronë, operacione të mbyllura etj)?

Kur të kemi pranuar se Evropa e vetme nuk ka forcat për të përballuar sfidat e ndryshme që hasen, pyetja bëhet: çfarë pushteti kontraktual do të kenë evropianët në vitet e ardhëshme, për të nxitur amerikanët t’i qëndrojnë besnikë deklaratave pak a shumë solemne, simbas të cilave kërcënimet kundrejt Evropës nuk janë vetëm një problem i yni, por edhe një problem i tyre?

Nga një anë është retorika, madje shumë e mirë, mbi nevojën e një të madhes “aleance të demokracive”, për të kundështuar autoritarizmat. Nga ana tjetër, veprimtaria politike e përditëshme e kryer nga zgjedhje e jo zgjedhje të vazhdueshme. Është një hall nëse këto dy përmasa të politikës largohen shumë prej njëra tjetrës.

“Corriere della Sera”, 13 korrik 2021    Përktheu Eugjen Merlika   

Sanctions as a Tool of US Foreign Policy

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Comment: The Use of “Public Designation” under Section 7031 (c)

Republican and Democratic administrations have taken a similar approach to 7031 (c)… reflecting their foreign policy priorities or attitudes towards different countries… 7031 (c) serves as a versatile and effective tool of foreign policy. However, safeguards are needed to prevent any mishandling or politicization of a designation.

From: David L. Phillips and David J. Felsen


New York and Tirana — The U.S. Secretary of State can combat corruption and gross human rights violations by invoking the Section 7031 (c) provision, which bars individuals found to be highly corrupt or as egregious violators of human rights from entry to the United States. The recent designation of Albania’s former President and Prime Minister Sali Berisha raises questions about the process of sanctioning an individual under Section 7031 (c):  Should the person being investigated have the right to confront the accusations  through a transparent process? Once sanctioned, should there be the right to an appeal?

The U.S. Congress authorized a “public designation” visa restriction under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.  This provision was included in foreign operations appropriations legislation beginning in FY2008.

Under Section 7031 (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to deny entry to the U.S. by foreign officials about whom credible information exists indicating that they have been involved in “significant corruption”, including corruption related to the extraction of natural resources, or if these individuals are involved in the “gross violation of human rights”.   The entry restriction automatically applies to immediate family members of the foreign individuals in question even if they have not been directly involved in activities warranting sanctions.  

The designation is typically a “public designation”, though the Secretary of State may choose to invoke it “privately”.  It is the result of a lengthy interagency process, with conclusions made by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). INL is the lead agency organizing input from within the Department of State as well as from law enforcement, security, intelligence and other relevant agencies from the federal government and other levels of government. However, the designation should not be necessarily interpreted as involving any narcotics-related activity.

What is also noteworthy about Section 7031 (c) is that while the Secretary of State’s designation may be made publicly or privately, all records concerning banning of the designated individual are not confidential. That is, the information can be accessed publicly through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This is a clear variance from general policy and practice regarding the decision to issue or deny a visa, as provided in Section 222 (f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires that any records regarding the issuing or refusing of U.S. visas be kept strictly confidential.  

Section 7031 (c) is a powerful yet underutilized tool of US foreign policy. The threat that foreign officials may be publicly designated and shamed for engaging in significant corruption or human rights abuses and the threat to family members of being barred from entry to the U.S. is a strong disincentive or deterrent to foreign officials.  

U.S. foreign and treaty obligations may create some exemptions for individuals who may have been publicly designated.  An exemption from Section 7031 (c) can be made if the individual’s subsequent entry to the country furthers U.S. law enforcement objectives, if there are compelling national security interests, if circumstances have changed that had caused the designation in the first place, or if the individual’s entry fulfills U.S. obligations under the United Nations Headquarters Agreement.

Republican and Democratic administrations have taken a similar approach to 7031 (c). Yet, different administrations may interpret significant corruption and human rights abuses in different ways, reflecting their foreign policy priorities or attitudes towards different countries. The Trump administration designated the former President of the Gambia for significant corruption in 2018. Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council President was designated for significant corruption, and Serbian Goran Radosavljevic was publicly designated for violation of human rights in the murder of three Albanian-American brothers in Kosovo during the war.

During the Biden administration, Berisha was sanctioned in mid-May 2021 under Section 7031 (c) for significant corruption.  7031 (c) was also used to designate the former Prosecutor General of Slovakia for significant corruption; Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi was designated in March 2021. A Paraguayan Congressman was designated for significant corruption in April 2021. Congressman Boris Espana Carceres of Guatemala and two former Nambian government ministers were designated for significant corruption in June 2021. 

Yet the Trump Administration also extended the use of 7031 (c) to further political goals in Iran and Cuba. In November 2020, towards the end of the Trump Administration, Secretary of State Pompeo designated two Iranian military officials as human rights violators. In the case of Cuba, the final days of the Trump Administration saw the designation of Defense Minister Leopoldo Cintra Frias for violations of human rights. This was followed by Cuba’s labelling as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”. Cuba was placed on the SST list though it had previously been removed from the list by the Obama administration in 2015. 

In addition to the 7031 (c) designation, Executive Order 13818 of December 20th, 2017, which implemented the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (GMA), is another vehicle to target corruption and human rights violators.  GMA uses very similar language to 7031 (c).  However, E.O. 13818 also allows for the freezing of assets and blocking of transactions for designated individuals. During the Biden administration, several Bulgarian nationals charged with corruption in early June 2021 were designated under 7031 (c), while E.O. 13818 and other sanctions brought by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) were applied at the same time.  The Department of State’s statement of June 2nd indicated that E.O. 13818, which implements and builds upon the Magnitsky Act, targeted three oligarchs and 64 of their owned entities, while at the same time 7031 (c) designated five Bulgarians as ineligible for entry owing to “significant corruption”.

In sum, 7031 (c) serves as a versatile and effective tool of foreign policy. However, safeguards are needed to prevent any mishandling or politicization of a designation. Individuals should have the right to address questions about their conduct at some point in the process. Individuals should be able to argue why they may warrant an exemption. Once designated, a mechanism should exist to permit an appeal by the individual.  Lastly, until a final determination is made the process requires discretion so that reputations are not ruined unnecessarily.  

This article was originally published by Exit News on July 7, 2020

Mr. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peacebuilding and Human Rights at Columbia University in New York. He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert to the US State Department during the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. Mr. Felsen holds a doctorate in politics from Oxford University and is Vice-Rector for International Relations at Epoka University in Albania.

Kosovo Town Declares Emergency over ‘Contaminated Water’ Scare

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July 13, 202113:58– – Authorities in the western Kosovo town of Decan/Decani declared a state of emergency after more than 880 people were suspected to have fallen ill after drinking contaminated water.

BY Drenushe Ramadani and Xhorxhina Bami/ BIRN/

“A state of emergency has been declared on the entire territory of the municipality of Decan,” said the text of an official decision made by the mayor of Decan/Decani, Bashkim Ramosaj, on Tuesday.

Ramosaj said he made the decision because more than 880 people are suspected to have fallen ill as a result of drinking contaminated water in the municipality over the past two days.

Local residents in the villages of Prejlep, Rastavica, Irzniq, Gllogjan, Shaptej, Gramaqel, Baballoq, Ratisha and Jasic i Ri claimed they have suffered from diarrhea, dizziness, nausea and vomiting.

The spokesperson for the Basic Prosecution in Peja/Pec, Shkodran Nikci, told BIRN on Tuesday that two people have died and their bodies have been sent to the Institute of Forensic Medicine for autopsy to see if they were poisoned.

But Kosovo’s Health Minister Arben Vitia then told media that the two deaths “are not related to the [suspected water contamination] situation”.

Suspicions have been raised that the reported illnesses were caused by drinking water supplied by a company called Hidrodrini.

Based on these suspicions, the prosecution said that the Hidrodrini company’s water should not be used for drinking purposes in ten villages in Decan/Decani.

The first results of tests on the water have come back normal, however. The National Institute of Public Health, NIPH, is conducting further tests, the results of which will be known within 48 hours at the latest.

“So far, I assess that according to the first results, chemically there is no problem with the drinking water, the water is usable but we are waiting for more analysis,” the director of NIPH, Naser Ramadani, told Kosovo media on Monday.

The Hidrodrini company said in a statement on Tuesday that it stopped the water supply the moment that reports that people had fallen ill appeared.

But it said that “after a meeting of the Municipal Emergency Headquarters of Decan, it was decided that from 1pm, the supply from the water supply system for the area in question will be restored” .

However, it cautioned that despite this decision, the water should “not be used for drinking, but only for sanitary and hygienic needs” for the moment.

Mayor Ramosaj told media on Monday the estimated number of people who could have been affected was 884, although there is no officially-published data.

“We will not stop until we find out why it happened, this poisoning ….in the municipality of Decan, where so far there are 884 patients who have the same symptoms,” Ramosaj said.

He also said that this was “the second time in a month that the same scenario is being reported”.

One man, Zenel Kadriaj from the village of Rastavica, told BIRN that the water was coloured and had a large amount of chlorine in it.

But another man, Hysni Alickaj from the village of Irzniq, said that his five daughters fell ill but not as a result of drinking water because he does not have a water supply system in the house.

Ramadani, the director of NIPH, also told media there are people who have displayed symptoms but who have not consumed water supplied by Hidrodrini at all.