By Cafo Boga, M.S. in Diplomacy – September 20, 2026/
James Carville’s famous phrase—“It’s the economy, stupid”—helped focus Bill Clinton’s successful 1992 presidential campaign on the issue that mattered most to ordinary Americans: their economic well-being. More than three decades later, a version of that message should be delivered to the prime ministers of Albania, Kosova, and Montenegro: It is the economy, Prime Minister—but first, it is the people.
These three countries are not identical. Each has its own political system, economic circumstances, and national challenges. Yet their leaderships share a troubling tendency: power has become increasingly personalized, while governments have become progressively disconnected from the people they are supposed to serve.
Their prime ministers dominate television, social media, public ceremonies, international meetings, and national political debate. They announce tourism records, salary increases, infrastructure projects, foreign investments, and progress toward European integration. They frequently present themselves as the indispensable guardians of the nation.
But leadership is not measured by the number of speeches delivered, projects announced, or international leaders received. It is measured by whether citizens can live with dignity, whether institutions function without political interference, and whether young people can imagine a future in their own countries.
Albania A Crisis of Trust Democracy and Economic Direction
Prime Minister Edi Rama can point to genuine achievements. Albania’s international visibility has increased, tourism has expanded, infrastructure has improved, and the country has progressed in its negotiations with the European Union.
But after so many years in power, a growing number of Albanians no longer trust either Rama or Sali Berisha—or the political establishments they represent.
The continuing demonstrations are no longer solely protests against an individual government decision. They reflect a much deeper rejection of a political order dominated for decades by the same personalities, parties, networks, and methods of government. What began with opposition to controversial development and environmental decisions has broadened into demands for political accountability, constitutional and electoral reform, and democratic renewal.
Many Albanians increasingly believe that both Rama and Berisha should withdraw from frontline politics and allow a new generation of leaders to emerge. Whether or not one agrees with every demand of the demonstrators, the persistence of the protests reveals a profound crisis of confidence in Albania’s existing political class.
The economic problem is equally fundamental. Albania cannot build a sustainable economy primarily upon seasonal tourism, construction projects, speculative property development, remittances, and real-estate investments whose financing is not always sufficiently transparent. Hotels, apartment towers, resorts, and luxury developments may increase the official value of economic activity, but they do not necessarily create a balanced and productive economy.
A sound economy must also manufacture, cultivate, process, innovate, and export.
Albania needs factories, modern agriculture, food-processing industries, technology enterprises, vocational education, regional development, and reliable employment throughout the year. It must produce more of what its citizens consume and export enough goods and services to narrow its structural trade imbalance—without treating remittances from emigrants and seasonal tourism receipts as substitutes for domestic production.
The ultimate judgment upon Albania’s economy is not the number of foreign visitors entering the country. It is the number of Albanians who believe they must leave it.
Albania is confronting a severe demographic crisis driven by mass emigration and declining fertility. The United Nations Population Fund has warned that the country’s population is steadily shrinking as these two forces reinforce one another. Precise estimates of the Albanian population abroad vary, and Albania should not be described categorically as having Europe’s lowest birth rate without fully comparable current data. The central conclusion, however, is undeniable: Albania is losing a substantial share of its young and productive population while the population remaining at home grows older.
A country cannot construct a successful future if its most ambitious young people see departure as their best opportunity.
Kosova Winning Elections Is Not the Same as Governing
Albin Kurti entered government with considerable moral and political authority. He promised to challenge corruption, strengthen the state, defend Kosova’s sovereignty, and break with the compromised practices of the old political establishment.
Those objectives remain important. But winning the largest number of votes does not give one party ownership of every major institution.
Kosova is a parliamentary democracy. It requires negotiation, coalition-building, institutional restraint, and compromise. The prime minister must govern not only for those who voted for him but also for citizens represented by other parties.
Kurti has not succeeded in building a durable national consensus with the opposition. Because Vetëvendosje received the most votes, he too often appears to proceed as though the country’s highest governing positions should naturally remain under the control or decisive influence of his party. The opposition, meanwhile, has frequently responded with obstruction rather than responsible cooperation.
The result has been prolonged political paralysis, repeated elections, delayed reforms, and continuing difficulty in resolving the presidency. Kosova faces the danger of another costly election that may reproduce essentially the same political arithmetic. The impasse also threatens international financing, institutional reform, and the country’s European ambitions.
Responsibility does not rest upon Kurti alone. Opposition parties must also place the country above partisan calculation. But as the leader with the strongest electoral mandate, Kurti carries the greatest responsibility for initiating compromise.
He must become more of a democratic moderator and less of a commanding and uncompromising political figure. Leadership is not demonstrated by prevailing in every dispute. Sometimes it is demonstrated by making the first concession necessary to move the country forward.
Kosova also needs less permanent political confrontation and far greater concentration on its economy: employment, energy, education, agriculture, manufacturing, investment, exports, and the departure of its young people.
Sovereignty is essential—but sovereignty must produce a functioning state and a better life for the people who live in it.
Montenegro European Integration Without Genuine Decentralization
Montenegro presents itself as a multicultural state and the leading candidate for European Union membership. On paper, Albanians enjoy equal constitutional and political rights. In practice, however, formal equality has not always produced equal influence, economic development, institutional representation, or control over local resources.
The cultural and historical divide cannot be ignored. Albanians are not a Slavic people, and their language, identity, history, and relationship with the state are distinct. Montenegro can become a genuine multiethnic democracy only when it treats that difference as part of the country’s richness rather than as an inconvenience to be administratively managed.
Albanian-populated areas have not received economic development proportionate to their natural resources and potential. As a result, many Albanians have emigrated—particularly to the United States—leaving their communities demographically and economically weakened.
This makes proposed changes affecting local self-government especially important. The government may claim that legislative amendments are necessary to harmonize Montenegro’s laws with European standards. But harmonization with Europe should strengthen decentralization, subsidiarity, consultation, and local democracy—not transfer additional authority from municipalities to the central government.
The European Commission has already observed that, although Montenegrin municipalities possess formal responsibilities, they frequently require central-government approval, have limited financial autonomy, and are not always consulted about legislation that directly affects them. The fact that the Union of Municipalities submitted dozens of amendments to the proposed legislation demonstrates that these concerns are neither marginal nor confined to Albanian municipalities.
For Ulqin, however, the danger is particularly serious. The municipality possesses some of Montenegro’s most valuable remaining coastal resources, including Velika Plaža—Long Beach—and other strategically important land. If the central government can make consequential decisions concerning municipal territory and assets without the municipality’s meaningful consent, local self-government becomes largely symbolic.
It would be premature to state as an established fact that the government intends to sell municipal property without municipal approval unless the final statutory language proves that conclusion. It is entirely legitimate, however, to warn that further concentration of authority creates the risk that decisions about valuable municipal assets could be made against the wishes of the communities that own, inhabit, and depend upon them. European integration cannot become a label used to justify centralization.
The Illusion of the Omnipotent Leader
Rama, Kurti, and Milojko Spajić differ greatly in personality, political history, and governing circumstances. But each must confront the same democratic truth: a prime minister is not the state.
A leader who dominates every political conversation may appear powerful, but that power often conceals institutional weakness. If ministers cannot act independently, parliaments cannot scrutinize government, municipalities cannot protect their assets, opposition parties cannot contribute, and citizens cannot influence decisions, democracy becomes dependent upon the personality of one individual.
No prime minister can personally create employment, administer justice, educate children, manage municipalities, protect the environment, attract responsible investment, and defend democracy. These responsibilities require competent institutions and a political culture that survives individual leaders.
When every achievement is credited to the leader, every failure must also become his responsibility.
What Would an Ideal Democratic System Look Like
1. Government belongs to the people. Elected officials exercise temporary authority entrusted to them by citizens; they do not own the state.
2. Institutions are stronger than individuals. Courts, parliaments, municipalities, regulators, public administrations, and the media must function independently of the governing party.
3. The majority governs but it does not rule without limits. Opposition parties and minority communities must have meaningful participation and legal protection.
4. Compromise is a democratic responsibility. A leader who cannot negotiate cannot govern a pluralistic society effectively.
5. Local communities must control local affairs. Decisions about municipal land, development, culture, and resources should not be imposed by central authorities without genuine consultation and consent.
6. The economy must serve society. Growth must create productive employment, support agriculture and industry, encourage exports, and offer young people a reason to remain.
7. Public office must remain temporary. Democratic leaders should strengthen institutions and prepare successors rather than cultivate personal indispensability.
8. Citizens must be heard between elections. Peaceful protest, independent journalism, civil society, and public consultation are not threats to government; they are safeguards of democracy.
The Case for Term Limits
Albania, Kosova, and Montenegro should seriously consider limiting certain senior executive offices—including the prime ministership—to two full consecutive terms, followed by at least one complete term out of office. Although term limits for prime ministers are uncommon in established European parliamentary democracies, those countries generally possess stronger institutional safeguards. In younger democracies, where political parties and state institutions can become dominated by powerful individuals, carefully designed term limits could encourage political renewal, create opportunities for a new generation of leaders, and reduce the danger that one person will capture a party, weaken democratic institutions, and build a political personality cult that refuses to disappear.
Term limits alone, however, cannot protect democracy. A departing prime minister may continue controlling the governing party or attempt to exercise power through a chosen successor. Term limits must therefore be accompanied by internal party democracy, transparent political financing, independent courts and media, a professional civil service, strong parliamentary oversight, and effective protections against conflicts of interest and political patronage.
No person should remain in power long enough to convince himself—or the country—that the state cannot function without him.
A Moment for Honest Self Assessment
The political leaderships of Albania, Kosova, and Montenegro have not yet succeeded in building sufficiently stable democracies or productive economies capable of meeting the needs of their people.
This does not mean that nothing has been achieved. Nor does it mean that every failure belongs exclusively to the current prime ministers. The region inherited weak institutions, historical conflicts, corruption, economic underdevelopment, and political divisions.
But leaders are elected to overcome inherited problems—not to use them indefinitely as explanations.
The political elites of all three countries must undertake an honest assessment of their performance. They must abandon the belief that political dominance is equivalent to successful government and develop a new approach based upon institutional democracy, economic production, local authority, national consensus, and human dignity.
The final message is therefore not simply: It is the economy, Prime Minister.
It is something more fundamental: It is the people, Prime Minister. The economy must serve them, democracy must protect them, and government must remain accountable to them. You were elected to serve—not to rule above them.
