–HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSINSERBIA –Helsinki-Bulletin -NO.148 // MAy 2019 /
Photo: A. Vučić and M. Dodik with Patriarch Irinej and Holy Synod of the SPC -Foto: Dimitrije Goll /Tanjug /
The very fact that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has informed the Holy Synod of the Ser- bian Orthodox Church /SPC/ about negotiations on Kosovo (and their outcomes up to now) be- fore letting the Parliament and domestic public know anything about it testifies of SPC’s stan- ding over the past decades. And it also testifies of the Church’s traditional ambitions to cruci- ally influence social, political and governmental decisions.
In the early 1980s SPC imposed itself on the so- ciety as a major player. By insisting on the Gre- ater Serbia project together with Serbia’s natio- nalistic political and intellectual elites it became a major pillar of the regime’s plans before and during the wars.
Following on Milošević’s ouster and in the pe- riod of transition from socialism to a multi- party system such a “credit” made it possible for SPC to strengthen its position and role. Given than its strategic goals considerably overlap with those of Serbia’s elites, after 2000 all regimes tre- ated Church dignitaries with respect. Occasional discrepancies would only play into the hands of SPC to get another concession from the regime.1
And so, shortly after 2000 the Synod demanded that religious teaching should be incorporated into school curricula. Religious teaching and then priests preaching in military institutions were requests directly influencing many other and more important issues. Vojislav Koštunica, the then SRY president, was and remained a po- litician closest to the Church whom Bishop Amfi- lohije recently named as “politician truly mirro- ring the very being of this nation.”2 He enabled SPC to occupy the public space and gave it a free pass to all institutions, including educational.
Ever since 2000 SPC has been actively involved in resolution of the status for Kosovo. It has been strongly arguing that “the state should call for international guarantees for the legal status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the province, and its temples and facilities.”3 It has been the only Serbian institution that functi- ons in Kosovo and is hugely trusted by Kosovo Serbs. It is also the only institution, in Kosovo and in other neighboring countries, that sticks to the delusion about pan-Serbian unification. Namely, it bases the unity of the Serbian nation on the so-called “Serbian spiritual space.” It ar- gues that there can be no state of Serbia without Kosovo because “Serbia is a temple, and Kosovo its altar.” “Without an altar the very existence of a temple is meaningless. Serbia is a body and
1 When Zoran Đinđić extradited Slobodan Milošević to ICTY, helped to have construction of the St. Sava Temple in Belgrade finalized as rependance for that “anti-Christian act,” and introduced religious teaching into elementary school curricula.
2 Danas, May 17, 2019.
3 Večernje Novosti, February 6, 2013, http:// www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290. html:418599-Crkva-nece-ugovor-sa-Kosovom.
| SPC has been living in harmony with the state most the time. But this harmony was disrup- ted in 2018 when the idea about demarcation between Serbs and Albanians, as a possible compromise solution of the status of Kosovo, began circulating.7 Namely, presidents Vučić and Thachi, and Albanian Premier Rama were ne- gotiating a border change, that is Kosovo’s par- tition. Besides local players the proposal found an echo in a rather large circle of international officials (including a part of American admini- stration) and in a much bigger circle of infor- mal, though influential actors and lobbyists on both sides. SPC was the most influential opponent to the idea at home. In the past 150 years it has been arguing that Kosovo is a foundation of its iden- tity. Its highest dignitaries backed up their co- unterparts in Kosovo, Bishop of Raska-Prizren Teodosije and Abbot of the Visoki Dečani Mona- stery Sava (Janjić). Mutual accusations and harsh words followed. The demarcation idea is shelved for the time being. Key international factors helmed by Ger- many and Chancellor Merkel turned it down as unacceptable and made this clear to Vučić at the Berlin Summit in late April. Vučić was visibly crestfallen and frustrated, and shared his fee- lings with the public at home. His visit (in tandem with Milorad Dodik who spends more time in Serbia than in Bosnia) to SPC dignitaries during the May Session of SPC Synod came as a surprise. Observers speculate that was an attempt at patching things up, “re- demption,” “sharing the burden of common anxieties,” “ensuring support,” etc. 7 “Demarkation” or partition (of Kosovo) is the only option Serbia has had in the matter of Kosovo in the past half a century. Namely, for excluding Kosovo from its sovereignity Serbia would be compensated with four municipalities in Kosovo North where Serbs are in majority. | Although Patriarch Irinej obviously sided with him and praised him for “heroic struggle for Serbia and Kosovo alike, and everything connec- ted with Serbian name,”8 the Synod said as one that it would not give up its strong stance about Kosovo. “Any change in the status of Kosovo and Metohija leading either to recognition of Kosovo’s independence or any variant of territo- rial partition, a precondition to a possible de- marcation, is unacceptable to the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church. All such solutions would surely result in exodus of the remaining Serbian people that lives in majority Albanian populated areas and inflict unforeseeable da- mage on our spiritual and cultural heritage,” quotes the Synod’s release.9 The Synod not only invokes the UNSC Res. 1244 but also the fact that neither Russia and China nor five other EU member-states have recognized Kosovo up to now.10 SPC’s staunch stance was interpreted as its re- fusal to give the head of the state a free hand for any of his options for Kosovo. According to commentator Cvijetin Milivojević, the release is “painful” for the regime, which means that it will go one with its showdown with bishops cri- tical of Vučić’s Kosovo policy.11 And yet, it is possible in the context of some new developments that Vučić and Church dignitaries could find some “common ground.” Namely, if after his demarcation idea failed Vučić decides to put off the issue of Kosovo until some future time, Serbia’s Presidency and the Patriarchy will find themselves together in a “frozen conflict.”12 True, the Synod release claims that SPC opposes 8 Politika, May 14, 2019. 9 Danas, May 18-19, 2019. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 One of the President’s unbecoming statements given following on is meeting in the Patriarchy – “Everybody plays dead and so I will be playing dead too,” indicates such possible scenario. TVN1, May 18, 2019. |
| SPC has been living in harmony with the state most the time. But this harmony was disrup- ted in 2018 when the idea about demarcation between Serbs and Albanians, as a possible compromise solution of the status of Kosovo, began circulating.7 Namely, presidents Vučić and Thachi, and Albanian Premier Rama were ne- gotiating a border change, that is Kosovo’s par- tition. Besides local players the proposal found an echo in a rather large circle of international officials (including a part of American admini- stration) and in a much bigger circle of infor- mal, though influential actors and lobbyists on both sides. SPC was the most influential opponent to the idea at home. In the past 150 years it has been arguing that Kosovo is a foundation of its iden- tity. Its highest dignitaries backed up their co- unterparts in Kosovo, Bishop of Raska-Prizren Teodosije and Abbot of the Visoki Dečani Mona- stery Sava (Janjić). Mutual accusations and harsh words followed. The demarcation idea is shelved for the time being. Key international factors helmed by Ger- many and Chancellor Merkel turned it down as unacceptable and made this clear to Vučić at the Berlin Summit in late April. Vučić was visibly crestfallen and frustrated, and shared his fee- lings with the public at home. His visit (in tandem with Milorad Dodik who spends more time in Serbia than in Bosnia) to SPC dignitaries during the May Session of SPC Synod came as a surprise. Observers speculate that was an attempt at patching things up, “re- demption,” “sharing the burden of common anxieties,” “ensuring support,” etc. 7 “Demarkation” or partition (of Kosovo) is the only option Serbia has had in the matter of Kosovo in the past half a century. Namely, for excluding Kosovo from its sovereignity Serbia would be compensated with four municipalities in Kosovo North where Serbs are in majority. | Although Patriarch Irinej obviously sided with him and praised him for “heroic struggle for Serbia and Kosovo alike, and everything connec- ted with Serbian name,”8 the Synod said as one that it would not give up its strong stance about Kosovo. “Any change in the status of Kosovo and Metohija leading either to recognition of Kosovo’s independence or any variant of territo- rial partition, a precondition to a possible de- marcation, is unacceptable to the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church. All such solutions would surely result in exodus of the remaining Serbian people that lives in majority Albanian populated areas and inflict unforeseeable da- mage on our spiritual and cultural heritage,” quotes the Synod’s release.9 The Synod not only invokes the UNSC Res. 1244 but also the fact that neither Russia and China nor five other EU member-states have recognized Kosovo up to now.10 SPC’s staunch stance was interpreted as its re- fusal to give the head of the state a free hand for any of his options for Kosovo. According to commentator Cvijetin Milivojević, the release is “painful” for the regime, which means that it will go one with its showdown with bishops cri- tical of Vučić’s Kosovo policy.11 And yet, it is possible in the context of some new developments that Vučić and Church dignitaries could find some “common ground.” Namely, if after his demarcation idea failed Vučić decides to put off the issue of Kosovo until some future time, Serbia’s Presidency and the Patriarchy will find themselves together in a “frozen conflict.”12 True, the Synod release claims that SPC opposes 8 Politika, May 14, 2019. 9 Danas, May 18-19, 2019. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 One of the President’s unbecoming statements given following on is meeting in the Patriarchy – “Everybody plays dead and so I will be playing dead too,” indicates such possible scenario. TVN1, May 18, 2019. |
| a frozen conflict and stands for continua- tion of the dialogue freed from “pressures and blackmails,” but considering the stance it has had up to now that would be a quite unexpecta- ble turn of the tide.13 The biggest part of Serbia’s cultural and in- tellectual elite shares SPC’s stance on Kosovo as evidenced during the “inner dialogue” the Pre- sident had launched. “With the helping hand from the Church, science and culture Serbia sho- uld not give way because we could not give up that region (Kosovo),” says academician Ljubo- drag Dimić.14 However, President of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Vladimir Kostić says that the only option will be to leave Kosovo “with dignity” given that it is in Serbia’s hands no more, either de facto or de jure, and some- one must go public with this. In an interview with Radio Belgrade (2015), he said that SANU has not yet articulated its stance about the issue, adding, “Kosovo implies a bunk of our cultural heritage and we should struggle for it tooth and nail. This is an attempt to take away from us a substrate of our history and psychology, and just name it. But to be honest, if any minister, pre- mier of president has to ask for a permit to en- ter this territory, we evidently have neither hu- man, economic nor any other resources to have our way. We can be fooling one another but an alternative is more than clear.”15 13 Politika, May 18, 2019. 14 Pravoslavlje, May 15, 2019. 15 http://mondo.rs/a840148/Info/Srbija/Predsednik-SANU- Vladimir-Kostic-Kosovo-nije-deo-Srbije.html. | VISIT TO SPC: a TRy TO REaCH aN aGREEMENT Many controversies accompanied President Vučić’s visit to bishops during the session of the Holy Synod, most of all because governmental and Church top brass to not meet that often.16 The word had it that not all bishops were glad to see him in their seat, and some were making no bones about it.17 The latter were quite at odds with him about the Kosovo issue. Open conflicts between the Church and the re- gime broke out in the summer of 2018 once the idea about Kosovo’s partition was “semi-le- galized.” Of all opponents to it are bishops “in the field,” Bishop Teodosije and Abbot Sava. By saying that regimes in Belgrade and Pri- stina were provoking a violent conflict in Ko- sovo North in order to establish a “new reality” in the field along a planned demarcation line, Bishop Teodosije was turned into a target of a smear campaign by tabloids close to the regime and TV Pink throughout August and September. Belgrade’s yellow press was calling him “a trai- tor,” while their Pristina counterparts “a cigarette smuggler” and a priest who had blessed Arkan18 During the December 2018 session the Synod publicly supported Kosovo bishops under the fire, and stand against any form of Serbia’s gi- ving up Kosovo. “What is most troubling un- der the veil of demarcation between Serbs and Albanians is the possibility of having the most important and biggest, if not the entire, part of Kosovo from Serbia cut off, and having it 16 Before Vučić only Slobodan Milošević paid such a visit in the 1990s. . 17 Quoting its sources among bishops, the Danas daily reported this and other developments going on behind closed doors. The media close to the regime attacked it for it, while officials such as Vučić’s secretary Nikola Selaković, who was in the delegation, tried to negate and deny such reporting. 18 Danas, August 25-26, 2018. |
recognized as a part of independent Kosovo or the so-called Greater Albania,” says a release.19
Vučić’s advocacy for Kosovo’s partition as an act of “historical compromise” between Serbs and Albanians turned out as a fiasco in the Berlin Summit. His has been obviously inspired by the stance first launched by Dobrica Ćosić. Ćosić had said on several occasions, “A compromise between historical and ethnic rights was for me a solution to the centurial antagonism between Serbs and Albanians. Such compromise implies the right of Albanians in the territories where they are in majority to unite with their mother land, Albania. Territorial partition and demarca- tion between Serbs and Albanians should not be imbued with aspirations after ethnically clean territories, but with reciprocity when it comes to national and civil rights for minorities. Kosovo within Serbia that is biologically exhausted and demographically depressed will in two decades only turn it into a federation of two constantly antagonized nations. Life in such a community would be hard, and progress slowed down.”20
Disappointed with the international community and his own people (“Which has not given me a hand”) Aleksandar Vučić decided to pay a visit to the Patriarchy at the time of its major spiritual session; aware that unlike the Patriarch many church dignitaries do not respect nor support him, he probably wanted to smooth mutual differences.
After the talks behind closed doors that lasted more than two hours, he told the press that he had spoken truly and sincerely “about everyt- hing that troubles our people” and warned that “we paid dear once when we behaved in dis- cord with realities.”21 “It is our duty to fight, not to succumb to blackmail and give up what we
19 NIN, May 16, 2019.
20 Interview with Dobrica Ćosić, Večerne Novosti, March 20, 2008.
21 Politika, May 14, 2019.
| it directly – as the Ukrainian church has been under its and Moscow Patriarchy’s canonic ju- risdiction for long – and in the latter because of a possible precedent in the cases of Orthodox churches in Montenegro and Macedonia that are also aspiring towards independence. This church problem – accompanied by major political repercussions – emerged in the 1990s following on disintegration of complex federa- tions, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. When their states became independent some domicile churches raised the question of their autonomy. This resulted in the foundation of new churches – precisely in Ukraine and Montenegro – consi- dered “schismatic” by their former “headquar- ters.” Macedonia is here a unique case – its do- micile church began calling for autonomy at the time of the federal state, in 1967. Its action was a part of the strategy for strengthening of Mace- donian identity. Yugoslavia used to invest huge resources in Macedonia’s cultural scene (Natio- nal Theater, language standardization, etc.). Even before Patriarch Bartolomeo took this step SPC dignitaries had been strongly against it and hoping he would never say yes, since, as Bishop of Backa Irinej put it, “that would a bigger and deeper schism than all the previous ones in hi- story of the Church, quantitatively bigger even than the schism in 1054.”28 He was aware at the time that in the future the “Ukrainian scenario” could take place in the closest neighborhood.29 28 Politika, September 24, 2018. 29 “Just imagine this so as to better understand what it is all about: a delagation from Bosporus arrives in Skopje to examine a mode and procedure for giving autocephalic status to the local church thati is disunited with all other churches, while silently bypassing the cannonic church and its head…One can imagine even a bigger oxymoron: a similar delegation arrives in Cetinje and begins developing a procedure for assigning auto-cephalic status to Miraš Dedeić and his schismatic sekt.” Ibid. | All the time until Patriarch Bartolomeo decided in favor of the Ukrainian Church, SPC dignita- ries were busy mediating between Constanti- nople and Moscow patriarchies. Only Patriarch Irinej met with both Moscow Patriarch Cyril and the Constantinople Patriarch but all that was in vain.30 Moscow Patriarchy broke every tie with Con- stantinople (Istanbul is still so named by Ea- stern Orthodox terminology), and SPC sided with Moscow. To reaffirm its attitude, SPC Synod stressed out in its final release that it “recogni- zes not the newly established para-religious structure in Ukraine.”31 SPC aND aUTOCEPHaLIC STaTUS OF THE UKRaINIaN CHURCH The May SPC Synod discussed Patriarch Bartolomeo’s decision to assign autocephalic sta- tus to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In the ensuing dispute between Constantinople and Moscow patriarchies SPC sided with the Ru- ssian Church. Such solidarity was to be expected given that SPC fears that the Patriarch of Con- stantinople could do the same for churches in Macedonia and Montenegro. Ongoing turmoil in the Eastern Orthodox world is another chall- enge to SPC dignitaries. The Synod also discussed “the inner misun- derstanding” arising from the decision on the Ukrainian Church. Unlike his counterparts in Serbia Bishop of America West Maxim showed more understanding for Bishop Bartolomeo’s move. In an interview he reminded his “spiri- tual brothers” that 800 years ago St. Sava mana- ged to get autocephaly for the Serbian Orthodox Church in a “non-canonic way.” His attitude and 30 Politika, October 2, 2018. 31 Politika, May 19, 2019. |
the polemic he had over it with SPC spokesman Bishop of Backa Irinej heated the atmosphere in the hall. Some speculated that Bishop Maxim could be seriously punished. How all this ended remained unclear. According to some, Bishop Maxim got a pardon after demurely saying that he was sorry for giving “a tactless and inappro- priate statement,32 while others claimed that a paragraph about a pardon to Bishop Maxim was taken out from the release.33
MaCEDONIa: RENEWaL OF a DIaLOGUE BETWEEN SPC aND MPC?
SPC denies Montenegrin (CPC) and Macedonian (MPC) Orthodox churches that once they get autocephaly round off their identities and thus make a clear break with Serbhood, which nega- tes both Montenegrin and Macedonian nations. SPC misses no opportunity to criticize not only SPC but also Podgorica’s attitude towards Russia and its course towards EU and NATO.
At the session of “the Church government” SPC decided to renew a dialogue with the canoni- cally unrecognized MCP. Relations between the two churches fit in the corps of Serbia-North Macedonia relationship wherein the state (Ser- bia) stands by “its” church. Although not so explosively as in the case of Montenegro (for Skopje Belgrade prefers some other methods of destabilization, mostly of intelligence nature), the church issue between Serbia and Macedo- nia has been simmering for more than half a century.
As of 1967 two parallel churches have been ope- rating in Macedonia: the self-proclaimed and unrecognized Macedonian Church and canonic Ohrid Eparchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church. On several occasions have SPC and MPC tried
32 Ibid. 33 Danas, May 20, 2019.
MONTENEGRO: SPC aND ITS DESTaBILIZING POLITICaL ROLE
Unlike in Macedonia where the Ohrid Eparchy is not exactly engaged in unclerical activities, SPC – acting through its “man No. 1” Metropo- litan of Montenegro-Adriatic Coast Amfilohije – stands for a major factor of destabilization at Montenegro’s political and social scene. Pro- Serbian opposition in Montenegro is its trusted ally in the business, along with political and ecclesiastical elites in Belgrade still opposing Montenegro’s independence.
As of 2000 the non-canonic Montenegrin Ort- hodox Church Belgrade-seated media pejorati- vely label “a non-governmental organization,” adding occasionally that it “was established in a police station in Cetinje” has been operating in parallel with SPC.38 It has to be noted that the once autocephalic Montenegrin Orthodox Church has placed its independence on the altar of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 1918. Ever since it has been a part of SPC’s ca- nonic structure.
Montenegro would surely want to crown its in- dependence with independence of its domicile church. “I take we should go on working wisely on the renewal of autocephalic Montenegrin Orthodox Church, and the state will be engaged in this as it is its responsibility,” said Montene- grin President Milo Đukanović.
This is why SPC dignitaries have been perma- nently strongly accusing Đukanović and min- cing no words about him.39 “Now they are
38 Politika, July 25, 2018.
39 Politika, December 23, 2018.
CONCLUSION aND RECOMMENDaTIONS
Ever since the Middle Ages the Serbian national identity has been closely connected with SPC. As the sole organized safekeeper of national memory, SPC has been preserving and passing on the myth about the medieval Serbian state lost in Kosovo, and preaching for its renewal. The Serbian people have entered the modern era, the era of establishing a national state of its own without modern political and cultural institutions. Religious identification has been trans- formed into national, and followed by the struggle for a nation-state. This makes the sum and substance of the traditional trinity – church, nation and state – SPC is even now promoting as a formula of Serbs’ cultural and political identity.
Since it perceives a Serbian nation-state as a pan-Serbian state, and the Serbian nation as an ethno-confessional community, SPC has never recognized the so-called AVNOJ borders: Ser- bia’s borders within the post-war Yugoslavia. It takes that revision of these borders as a mat- ter of existence of the Serbian people and the most important duty of its army. Not even after the Greater Serbian project suffered defeat has SPC made a minimal change in its position; and this is also reflected in its attitude towards Kosovo.
With its communicative dimension and some readiness for dialogue religion becomes more and more important. The dialogue has to be based on human rights and human dignity – on major messages of Biblical tradition. To become an actor of productive mediator between reli- gion and modern age SPC has first to face up its own role in past decades, admit its responsi- bility for supporting the war, the Greater Serbia project and ignoring crimes committed in the name of the devastating ideology.