The Promise of Europe and the Price of Waiting.
By Cafo Boga, M.A. in Diplomacy – October 13,2026
In Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, two men spend their days waiting for someone who never arrives, hopeful that tomorrow will finally bring what yesterday did not. For nearly three decades, the Western Balkans have been doing something remarkably similar.
Since the collapse of communism and the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia, membership in the European Union has been presented as the region’s destination—and often as the answer to its political, economic and institutional problems. Governments changed. Billions were spent on foreign assistance. Reforms were announced, laws adopted and accession negotiations opened. Yet the destination kept moving further away.
Now, just as Montenegro and Albania appear closer to membership than ever before, Brussels is considering another condition: future members could remain under enhanced supervision for democratic governance and the rule of law for as long as 15 years after accession, with financial sanctions and even suspension of certain membership rights in cases of serious democratic backsliding.
The concern is understandable. The EU does not want another Hungary—a country that met the requirements for membership and subsequently weakened democratic institutions. But the proposal raises a larger question: After nearly three decades of preparing the Western Balkans for membership, why is the European Union still so uncertain about the democratic institutions it helped these countries build? Perhaps the time has come to examine not only whether the Western Balkans have failed Europe, but whether Europe chose the right strategy for the Western Balkans.
A Transition That Was Never Properly Managed
When communism collapsed, countries such as Albania were expected almost overnight to transform authoritarian political systems and centrally planned economies into functioning democracies and competitive market economies.
But democracy requires much more than elections, political parties and a constitution. It requires independent courts, professional public administration, property rights, transparent financial institutions, free media, effective regulatory agencies and, above all, a political culture that accepts limits on power.
After decades of authoritarian rule—and in Albania’s case, extreme isolation—many of these institutions either did not exist or had little experience functioning independently. At precisely the same time, enormous amounts of formerly state-controlled wealth—factories, businesses, agricultural land, natural resources and valuable real estate—became available for privatization.
It was a dangerous combination: weak institutions, inexperienced governments, enormous economic opportunity and newly available private wealth.
What should have been an orderly transition toward democratic capitalism too often became something resembling the Wild West of the Balkans. Political influence and economic opportunity became intertwined. Those with connections could become wealthy quickly, while the institutions that should have protected the public interest were themselves still being created.
This is where the Western approach deserves examination.
The West certainly did not abandon the region. The European Union, the United States, USAID, OSCE, United Nations, World Bank and others invested substantial financial and human resources. Important reforms were introduced, infrastructure improved, civil society developed and new institutions were created.
Much good was accomplished, but assistance was frequently fragmented among projects, consultants, contractors, conferences, training programs and successive funding cycles. Too often, success could be demonstrated by money disbursed, people trained, legislation drafted or reports completed rather than by whether institutions became capable of functioning independently.
Training judges is not the same as creating an independent judiciary. Passing anti-corruption legislation is not the same as reducing corruption. Conducting elections is not sufficient if political power gradually overwhelms the institutions intended to restrain it. After three decades, the appropriate question is no longer how much assistance was provided, but what it ultimately produced.
The real measure of foreign assistance should be what remained after the money was spent.
Did the Western Balkans Need a Marshall Plan?
Following the Second World War, Europe confronted destruction on a scale almost unimaginable today. Cities and industries were devastated, economies shattered, millions displaced, and even defeated enemy countries had to be reconstructed and transformed into reliable members of a new European order. The United States responded with the Marshall Plan. Beginning in 1948, approximately $13 billion was committed over roughly four years. But its significance went far beyond money: it combined financing, technical expertise, economic planning, institutional cooperation and a clearly defined strategic purpose.
The Marshall Plan alone did not rebuild democratic Europe. European leadership, domestic institutions, American security guarantees and later European integration were also essential. Nevertheless, the result remains one of the remarkable achievements of the postwar era: devastated countries—and former enemies—became prosperous democracies and reliable partners.
The Western Balkans required a different kind of reconstruction. Their cities had not been destroyed on the scale of postwar Europe, but after decades of authoritarian government much of the institutional infrastructure necessary for democracy and market capitalism had to be reconstructed or created.
Perhaps what the region needed was its own version of a Marshall Plan—not simply more money, but a coherent strategy.
Such a strategy could have brought together experienced European and American professionals with domestic governments to build independent courts, professional civil services, credible regulatory institutions, transparent privatization systems and competitive market economies. It could have had a defined timetable, adequate financing, independent oversight and measurable objectives—with the ultimate purpose of making outside assistance progressively unnecessary.
Perhaps such an undertaking would have required ten or fifteen years. Nearly thirty years have now passed, and Brussels is contemplating another 15 years of extraordinary supervision after accession.
Surely that should cause us to ask whether something was fundamentally wrong with the original model.
Albania and the Contradictions of European Integration
Albania illustrates many of these contradictions.
For decades, EU membership has been presented as the country’s overriding national objective. Yet serious concerns continue over corruption, political accountability, public procurement, media independence, the judiciary and the concentration of political and economic power. Demonstrations in Tirana have increasingly challenged Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government and demanded greater accountability. Some protesters have gone further, calling for criminal investigations and the arrest of political leaders. Such accusations must be determined by independent courts, not by demonstrations, but the political dissatisfaction itself cannot be dismissed.
Meanwhile, European officials continue to engage closely with Albania’s leadership and frequently praise its progress toward European integration. Diplomatic engagement is necessary, but there is a difference between recognizing a government as the legitimate negotiating partner and appearing to provide political endorsement.
The EU should ask whether, in its desire for stability and geopolitical cooperation, it has sometimes become too comfortable with powerful political leaders and insufficiently attentive to the democratic institutions beneath them. A government that is convenient for Brussels is not necessarily evidence of a healthy democracy at home. There is also an uncomfortable contradiction within the European Union itself. Hungary has demonstrated the EU’s limited ability to reverse serious democratic backsliding once it occurs inside the Union; existing mechanisms have often proved cumbersome and politically difficult to enforce.
Yet Brussels now proposes stronger safeguards primarily for future members, risking the creation of two classes of membership. If judicial independence, democracy and the rule of law are fundamental European principles, they should apply equally to old members and new ones. The Western Balkans need reform. But so does the European Union.
National Interest Does Not End at the Door of Europe
The debate over accession must also address something too often treated as secondary: national interest. The slogan increasingly heard in Tirana—“Albania is not for sale”—should not be interpreted as hostility toward foreign investment. Albania needs foreign capital and should welcome legitimate investors regardless of whether they come from Europe, the United States, Israel, the Middle East or elsewhere.
But Albania is also a very small country with limited land, an extraordinary coastline, valuable agricultural resources, forests, mountains and natural assets that, once permanently transferred, may never return to public control. Economic development does not require selling strategic national assets. For major investments involving state-owned land, particularly coastal and agricultural property, Albania should seriously consider long-term leases—perhaps 99 years—instead of permanent sale. Investors would receive sufficient security to develop their projects, while Albania would retain ownership of the underlying land and continue receiving revenue from it.
Private property rights must, of course, be respected. But strategically important public land and natural resources belong not merely to the government that happens to hold office today; they are part of the inheritance of future generations. Before completing accession negotiations, Albania should determine which strategic assets require permanent protection and negotiate accordingly.
European integration should strengthen a country’s future—not require it to surrender legitimate national interests.
Should the Western Balkans Still Join the European Union?
After thirty years of waiting, repeated conditions and now the possibility of another 15 years of post-accession supervision, it is reasonable to ask whether joining the EU is still worth it. That question should not be dismissed as anti-European.
The European Union has become increasingly bureaucratic. Its decision-making can be slow and cumbersome. National interests frequently obstruct collective action, while migration, economic disparities, democratic backsliding and disagreements over sovereignty continue to test the Union.
Membership also has costs. Countries surrender some freedom of action, accept an enormous body of European regulation and expose domestic businesses and agriculture to stronger competition. Freedom of movement can accelerate the departure of young and skilled citizens from smaller and poorer countries.
For Albania and Montenegro, these are legitimate concerns. But the alternative must also be examined realistically.
The Western Balkans are geographically, economically and strategically part of Europe. Their principal markets, investors and trading relationships are closely connected to the continent. Remaining outside the EU would not insulate them from European rules; in many areas, they would still have to adapt to those rules while having little influence over writing them.
Membership offers access to the single market, European development funds, greater investment opportunities, freedom of movement, stronger legal protections and, eventually, a seat at the table where European decisions are made. For small countries, that matters.
There is also a strategic reality: in an increasingly unstable world, small states benefit from belonging to larger political and economic structures.
So despite my criticism of the process, I believe Albania and Montenegro should remain firmly on the path toward EU membership—but they should change the way they travel that path. They should stop behaving as though membership itself will solve their problems. Prosperity, better government and independent institutions should not have to wait for EU membership.
Albania and Montenegro do not need permission from Brussels to fight corruption, strengthen courts, improve education, modernize agriculture, protect national resources or create professional public administrations. Those are responsibilities of sovereign governments. A country incapable of governing itself successfully outside the European Union will not suddenly become well governed because it enters it.
Stop Waiting for Godot
The Western Balkans should continue toward Europe—but they should stop waiting for Europe to transform them. Albania, Montenegro and their neighbors should develop national economic and institutional strategies capable of succeeding whether accession comes in 2028, 2035 or later. They should build stronger democratic institutions, competitive economies and professional administrations, protect strategic national resources, and negotiate with Brussels from increasing strength rather than permanent dependency.
At the same time, the EU should undertake an honest assessment of three decades of assistance to the region: how much was spent, what succeeded, what failed and, most importantly, what survived after international support ended.
The responsibility for the disappointing results is shared. Western Balkan leaders must answer for corruption, weak institutions and failures of governance. International organizations should account for whether decades of assistance produced lasting results rather than permanent dependency. And the European Union should ask whether its enlargement strategy produced genuine transformation or merely managed an increasingly permanent transition.
The answer is not to abandon Europe. But neither is it to wait indefinitely for Europe. The lesson of the Marshall Plan was not that America rebuilt Europe while Europeans watched. Outside resources and expertise, combined with European leadership and responsibility, helped devastated countries rebuild themselves until they could stand on their own.
That should remain the ambition for the Western Balkans.
Albania, Montenegro and their neighbors should continue toward Europe—but they must build their countries as though Europe may not arrive tomorrow.
Europe should be a partner in their future, not the author of it. And perhaps that is the real lesson of Waiting for Godot: hope may give us a destination, but it cannot substitute for action. There comes a time when waiting itself becomes the problem.