By Jusuf Buxhovi/
The rise of the hegemonic Serbian state, beginning with autonomy in 1830 (on the scale of the Pashalik of Belgrade) and recognition as a state at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, culminating in its expansion into Albanian lands during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913—when Kosovo and Macedonia were recognized as Serbian—was built upon the “spiritual title deeds” of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its deceptions, presenting itself as “an essential part of Serbian spiritual and cultural identity since the Middle Ages.”
This deception, which was part of the Slavic-Russian concept to create vassal states (Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria) in the European part of the Ottoman Empire, relied heavily on the Serbian Orthodox Church and its claimed autocephaly from the 13th century onward. However, as will be shown, it was only a temporary autonomy from the Archbishopric of Ohrid (from 1219 to 1274).
The narrative of this deception persisted for eight centuries, as the Serbian Orthodox Church only gained true autocephaly in 1922, after the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Since ecclesiastical autocephaly was always tied to statehood, the Serbian Orthodox Church obtained this “right” only after the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which recognized the new kingdom. In August 1920, a state delegation appealed to the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople to unify three churches (Karlovci, Montenegro, and the Metropolitanate of Belgrade) into one, which under Karadjordjević influence, would be named the Serbian Orthodox Church.
The Holy Synod, in accordance with political realities—since ecclesiastical autocephalies were subordinate to state ones—approved the SKS state’s request, on the condition of a payment of 1.5 million French francs. This allowed the churches of Kosovo and Macedonia (until then under the jurisdiction of Constantinople) to be included in the hierarchy of the unified Serbian Orthodox Church. The final act of this agreement was signed in 1922 by the Patriarch of Constantinople.
Thus, this documented agreement makes it clear that there was no “continuity of Serbian ecclesiastical autocephaly” from the Middle Ages. Rather, the internationally recognized military occupation of Kosovo and Macedonia served two purposes: first, to legitimize the assimilation of Orthodox populations (Albanian and Macedonian) into Serbs, and second, to legitimize the appropriation of medieval Orthodox Christianity—including churches and monasteries—that had historically been shared religious sites.
Since this centuries-old fraud continues to produce political consequences for the state of Kosovo—especially because the Ahtisaari Plan treats Orthodox Christianity and religious sites as property of the Serbian Orthodox Church—it unjustly deprives Albanians (who adopted Christianity as early as the 4th century, before any Slavs existed in Illyria) of an important part of their spiritual and historical heritage. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the history of this fraud to ensure that the state of Kosovo defends its rightful claim to shared spiritual, cultural, and religious heritage. This is especially urgent as the issue becomes increasingly internationalized, while the Serbian state and its church continue their propaganda regarding an “eight-century historical and cultural right in Kosovo.”
This fraud aims to exclude Albanians from the most significant part of their historical-cultural identity—rooted in the medieval period when Illyria was its center. It also raises questions about the Nemanjid dynasty of Raška (which many ancient sources suggest had tribal origins) as part of this cultural-political dualism. This includes the deceptive formula of the “medieval Serbian state,” a claim that used the historical Dardanian core to establish a despotate supported by Catholic crusades and leveraged it to rise in Illyria with the goal of replacing the collapsing Byzantine Empire.
Not coincidentally, during the reign of Grand Župan Stefan Dušan, Raška was known in contemporary sources as Rasa, Rasien, Rex Rasien, or even “Illyricum Magna”—but never as the “Serbian Kingdom.” Thus, when Catholic crusaders sacked Constantinople in 1204 and declared the Latin Empire, while the Orthodox Church relocated to Nicaea, the church of Raška, centered in Žiča, received direct support from the Holy See. This facilitated an unlawful separation from the Archbishopric of Ohrid—where it had belonged since the time of Simeon—despite being confirmed as such by Byzantine Emperor Basil II in 1018.
The rewritten and manipulated documents of the Serbian Orthodox Church—especially through the hagiographies (monastic biographies) from Hilandar Monastery and other centers like Odessa, Karlovci, and Vienna from the 17th to 19th centuries—sought to justify the claim that the Serbian Orthodox Church was “recognized as autocephalous” by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. But credible documents show this was merely a temporary independence of the Žiča Bishopric from Ohrid, not actual autocephaly.
Even Dr. Dimitrije Ruvarac, archimandrite and manager of the Karlovci press and Patriarchal Library, stated:
“There is no doubt that Sava received some privileges for the Raška hierarchy in Nicaea, but it is impossible to identify these as constituting the great canonical act of establishing an autocephalous church.”
Similarly, historian Dr. Janko Šafarik, in a report from 1855 after researching Constantinople archives, said:
“We cannot document any act by which Saint Sava became an independent archbishop. No such act has been found to date.”
Church historian Svetozar Niketić, writing in 1870, noted that while the Serbian Church considered Sava independent, the archbishops were still confirmed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. It was only with Stefan Dušan that the temporary right to ordain bishops independently began being falsely presented as full autocephaly.
The Serbian Orthodox Church later edited nearly all ecclesiastical documents to promote this false narrative—especially those originating from Hilandar. This documented fact helps free Albanian historiography from the constraints of these manipulations, which are still widely quoted.
Even some objective Serbian authors, like Ilarion Ruvarac, acknowledge the Vatican’s behind-the-scenes influence during the Catholic conquest of Constantinople (1204–1261), during which the Patriarchate was exiled to Nicaea. When Sava of Raška sought separation from Ohrid, Bishop Dimitrije Homatian of Ohrid cursed him, stating that such a break was forbidden by apostolic canon law.
His letters remained ignored for over 50 years until the fall of the Latin Empire in 1261, when Byzantium returned to Constantinople, and the Orthodox Church resumed its place. This return was supported even by the Vatican, seeking to restore normal relations between the two world centers amid growing Ottoman threats.
As part of these developments, the ecclesiastical power of the Ohrid Archbishopric was restored, and the one-sided schism by Raška and Bulgaria—falsely claiming autocephaly—was rejected. At the Council of Lyon in 1274, it was declared that the act of independence in Nicaea had violated apostolic canon law, and the Ohrid Archbishopric was reestablished as the rightful ecclesiastical authority.
